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Adopting Civil Damages: Wrongful 
Family Separation in Adoption 
Malinda L. Seymore* 
Abstract 
The Trump Administration’s new immigration policy of family 
separation at the U.S./Mexico border rocked the summer of 2018. 
Yet family separation is the prerequisite to every legal adoption. The 
circumstances are different, of course. In legal adoption, the 
biological parents are provided with all the constitutional 
protections required in involuntary termination of parental rights, 
or they have voluntarily consented to family separation. But what 
happens when that family separation is wrongful, when the birth 
mother’s consent is not voluntary, or when the birth father’s wishes 
to parent are ignored? In theory, the child can be returned to the 
birth parents when consent is invalid because of fraud, coercion, or 
deceit. In actuality, courts are very reluctant to undo an adoption. 
How, then, to deter adoption agencies and workers from wrongfully 
separating birth parents and their children? 
Adoption agencies are not just social welfare institutions, but 
also businesses motivated by money. Lawsuits, as a cost of doing 
business, can affect their bottom line. The adoption industry has 
been responsive in the past to lawsuits from adoptive parents 
seeking money damages, which suggests that lawsuits from birth 
parents that affect the bottom line could incentivize better behavior 
from adoption agencies. This Article explores possible tort causes of 
action available to birth parents, including a proposed new tort of 
wrongful family separation, with the long-term objective of 
changing adoption agency behavior, potentially transforming 
adoption practice. 
                                                                                                     
 *  Professor of Law, Texas A&M University School of Law. 
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Is this what family is like: the feeling that everyone’s connected, 
that with one piece missing, the whole thing’s broken? 
    —Trenton Lee Stewart2 
                                                                                                     
 1. This is a popular hashtag posted by Twitter users on twitter.com. 
 2. TRENTON LEE STEWART, THE MYSTERIOUS BENEDICT SOCIETY 255 (2007).  
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The Trump Administration’s new policy of family separation 
of immigrants crossing the U.S./Mexico border rocked the summer 
of 2018.3 Stories of children held away from their families in cages,4 
audio recordings of children screaming as they are dragged away 
from their parents,5 all serve as the backdrop for a policy deemed 
by many as cruel and inhumane.6 Yet family separation is the 
prerequisite to every legal adoption.7 The circumstances are 
different, of course. In adoption, the biological parents are provided 
with all the constitutional protections of parenthood required in 
involuntary termination of parental rights, or they have 
voluntarily consented to family separation—that, too, is a 
prerequisite to adoption.8 But what happens when that family 
                                                                                                     
 3. See Louise Radnofsky, Natalie Andrews & Farnaz Fassihi, Trump 
Defends Family-Separation Policy, WALL STREET J., https://www.wsj.com 
/articles/trump-administration-defends-family-separation-policy-1529341079 
(last updated June 18, 2018) (last visited Jan. 10, 2019) (stating that the Trump 
Administration is blaming Congress for the family separation policy at the 
border) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 4. See Nomaan Merchant, Hundreds of Children Wait in Border Patrol 
Facility in Texas, ASSOCIATED PRESS (June 18, 2018), 
https://apnews.com/9794de32d39d4c6f89fbefaea3780769/Hundreds-of-children-
wait-in-Border-Patrol-facility-in-Texas (last visited Jan. 10, 2019) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 5. See Ginger Thompson, Listen to Children Who’ve Just Been Separated 
from Their Parents at the Border, PROPUBLICA (June 18, 2018, 3:51 PM), 
https://www.propublica.org/article/children-separated-from-parents-border-
patrol-cbp-trump-immigration-policy (last visited Jan. 10, 2019) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 6. See David Adler, Trump’s Family Separation Policy: Cruel, Inhumane, 
Tragic, IDAHO ST. J. (June 26, 2018), 
https://idahostatejournal.com/opinion/columns/trump-s-family-separation-policy-
cruel-inhumane-tragic/article_1f93cc9b-3918-550c-81b2-0f50ec16d9ab.html (last 
visited Jan. 10, 2019) (arguing that Trump’s family separation policy is immoral) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Richard Wolffe, Trump’s Cruel 
Border Policies Created a Needless Crisis. It’s Far from Over, GUARDIAN (June 20, 
2018, 5:25 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/jun/ 
20/trumps-cruel-border-policies-created-needless-crisis-far-from-over (last 
visited Jan. 10, 2019) (arguing that President Trump created the border crisis) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 7. See Malinda L. Seymore, Sixteen and Pregnant: Minors’ Consent in 
Abortion and Adoption, 25 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 99, 148 (2013) (“[For adoption,] 
a court must first terminate the parental rights of the birth parents before 
granting parental rights to the adoptive family.” (citing 2 AM. JUR. 2D Adoption 
§ 170 (2013)). 
 8. See id. (“The Supreme Court has long recognized parental rights as 
fundamental rights under the Constitution.” (citing Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 
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separation is wrongful, when the birth mother’s consent is not 
voluntary,9 or when the birth father’s wishes to parent are 
ignored?10 In theory, the child can be returned to the birth parents 
when consent is invalid because of fraud, coercion, or deceit.11 In 
actuality, courts are very reluctant to undo an adoption.12  
Consider the case of Tammy Lemley in Lemley v. Barr.13 
Tammy’s boyfriend convinced her to relinquish their child for 
adoption, but Tammy was upset and refused to sign the papers at 
the attorneys’ office.14 He convinced her to return the next day to 
sign the papers, which she did.15 But she was underage, making 
her consent void under Ohio law.16 The lawyers told her after she 
turned eighteen that she needed to sign more papers—actually, 
she needed to sign papers once she reached majority because the 
previous papers were void.17 That same day, her parents went to 
the lawyers to ask for the return of the child and to point out that 
Tammy’s consent was void because she was underage.18 The 
lawyers refused, having already delivered the child to a couple in 
                                                                                                     
645, 651 (1972)).  
 9. See id. (stating that consent must be “freely and willingly” given).  
 10. See id. (arguing that a minor needs additional protection when signing a 
consent to adoption).  
 11. See generally Marywood v. Vela, 53 S.W.3d 684 (Tex. 2001) (holding that 
the adoption consent was involuntary when the birth mother was promised an 
open adoption that was not legally enforceable in Texas); Queen v. Goeddertz, 48 
S.W.3d 928, 932 (Tex. App. 2001) (holding that the adoption consent was 
involuntary when the birth father was given an unenforceable promise of 
continued visitation post-adoption). 
 12. See infra note 24 and accompanying text (stating that courts are 
reluctant to undo adoptions because such actions infringe on the adopted child’s 
rights).  
 13. 343 S.E.2d 101 (W. Va. 1986). 
 14. See id. at 102–03 (“Tammy Lemley became upset, refused to sign the 
papers and left with the child.”).  
 15. See id. at 103 (stating that the couple later returned and signed the 
consent papers).  
 16. See id. (noting that an Ohio probate court judge had to witness and 
approve a minor’s consent).  
 17. See id. (stating that the couple met again with the lawyers to sign papers 
after Tammy Lemley reached eighteen).  
 18. See id. (stating that Tammy Lemley’s parents tried to explain that 
Tammy was only a minor at the time).  
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West Virginia for adoption.19 Tammy sued in Ohio and the court 
found that the lawyers “had obtained Tammy’s consent through 
duress, that she had no understanding of her position at the time 
she signed the adoption papers and, therefore, her consent was 
invalid.”20 Throughout the suit, the prospective adoptive parents 
refused to allow the lawyers to reveal their identities or the 
location of the child and during the pendency of the Ohio case, they 
went to court in West Virginia and finalized the adoption.21 When 
the Ohio court ordered the attorneys to reveal the identity of their 
clients, Tammy then went to court in West Virginia to seek return 
of her child.22 The West Virginia Supreme Court ruled that their 
state must give full faith and credit to the Ohio decree, making the 
West Virginia adoption void.23 The story does not end there, 
however. The court refused to order the return of the child without 
first examining the best interest of the child:  
The record before us is devoid of detailed evidence concerning 
what is now in the best interests of Ryan Barr. But we do know 
from the facts of record that Ryan is a five-year-old child who 
has spent almost his entire life with an adoptive mother, father 
and siblings in Huntington, West Virginia. If we now transfer 
custody to Miss Lemley, who counsel informs us has married, 
he will be taken to another place and brought up by people who 
are complete strangers to him. Although we cannot say that this 
is not in his best interests, we can at least say that there is some 
question in our mind whether such action is appropriate. 
Consequently, we remand this case to the circuit court for a 
determination of what physical custody arrangement is in 
Ryan’s best interests.24 
Tammy’s case is unremarkable in one sense—birth parents 
rarely succeed in reversing an adoption.25 It is quite remarkable in 
                                                                                                     
 19. See id. (stating that the lawyer said it was too late to do anything).  
 20. Id.  
 21. See id. (explaining that the adopting parents purposely avoided the Ohio 
court’s jurisdiction).  
 22. See id. (detailing that the Lemley family sought relief in the West 
Virginia court).  
 23. See id. (stating that the West Virginia Supreme Court ordered that the 
lower court must give the Ohio court judgment full faith and credit).  
 24. Id. at 109. 
 25. See id. at 109–10 (“The court expressed an interest in protecting the state 
adoption system and stated that the ‘system obviously could be greatly injured if 
prospective adoptive parents could not rely on the availability of children placed 
900 76 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 895 (2019) 
 
another sense—she fought through numerous court battles, 
something most birth parents cannot afford. Lawyers to fight an 
adoption don’t come cheap. 
In this Article, I argue that adoption agencies and facilitators 
operate as businesses as much as child welfare organizations. As 
long as it remains profitable to behave as the attorneys in Tammy’s 
case behaved, there is little downside to doing so. Courts are 
unlikely to disrupt the adoption,26 so lawyers and agencies lack 
incentive to behave better in avoiding wrongful family separation. 
If birth parents sue for money damages, driving up the cost of 
fraudulent practices, agencies might be deterred from misconduct 
that leads to wrongful family separation. After all, “[a]gencies and 
social workers fear lawsuits.”27 Further, suing for money damages 
incentivizes lawyers to take the case because they will recover a 
contingency fee if successful. 
In 1978, Elisabeth Landes and Richard Posner applied the 
lens of law and economics to adoption.28 The explicit use of market 
terminology: “supply and demand for babies,”29 “baby market,”30 
“free-market value of the child,”31 and comparing adoptable 
children in foster care to “an unsold inventory stored in a 
warehouse,”32 was disquieting for some readers. Many pushed back 
against the view that adoption of children in any way resembled a 
market.33 Margaret Brinig’s response to Posner’s proposal to price 
                                                                                                     
in their custody.’” (quoting In re Revocation of Appointment of a Guardian, 271 
N.E.2d 621, 624 (Mass. 1971)).  
 26. Supra note 24 and accompanying text.  
 27. Harvey Schweitzer & Daniel Pollack, Ethical and Legal Dilemmas in 
Adoption Social Work, 44 FAM. CT. REV. 258, 258 (2006). 
 28. Elisabeth M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economics of the Baby 
Shortage, 7 J. LEG. STUD. 323 (1978).  
 29. Id. at 324. 
 30. Id.  
 31. Id. at 328. 
 32. Id. at 327. 
 33. See Richard A. Posner, The Regulation of the Market in Adoption, 67 B.U. 
L. REV. 59, 59 (1987) (arguing that many critics have criticized the article The 
Economics of the Baby Shortage). Almost ten years later, Posner followed up with 
an article in which he mentions scholarly criticism both temperate and 
intemperate. See Mark Kelman, Consumption Theory, Production Theory and the 
Ideology of the Coase Theorem, 52 S. CAL. L. REV. 669, 688 n.51 (1979); J. Robert 
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babies in an adoption market was different: “The truth is that an 
adoption market already exists, however distasteful that may 
seem.”34 It is impossible to ignore the fact that adoption is “a nearly 
$2 billion-a-year U.S. business that is growing fast.”35 In Dr. 
Elizabeth Raleigh’s study of adoption agency workers, she found 
frequent references to the business nature of adoption.36 
One element of proof that adoption is a consumer-driven 
market responsive to litigation risk is the response of agencies to 
the flurry of lawsuits brought in the 1980s against adoption 
agencies by adoptive parents alleging fraud and/or negligence in 
adoption placements.37 Adoptive parents essentially claimed that 
adoption agencies failed to disclose information about the child’s 
physical and/or mental health, and that if the adoptive parents had 
been informed they would not have gone through with the 
adoption.38 These “wrongful adoption” lawsuits led to voluntary 
changes in agency practice and statutes mandating disclosure 
requirements,39 allowing agencies to avoid the risk of further 
lawsuits. 
This history suggests that adoption agencies—like most 
businesses—will be responsive to lawsuits that will affect their 
                                                                                                     
S. Prichard, A Market for Babies?, 34 U. TORONTO L.J. 341, 347–57 (1984). Indeed, 
a virtual cottage industry has sprung up to critique Posner’s market theory of 
adoption. See Jane Maslow Cohen, Posnerism, Pluralism, Pessimism, 67 B.U. L. 
REV. 105, 105 (1987) (questioning Posner’s economic approach to “baby markets”); 
John J. Donohue III & Ian Ayres, Posner’s Symphony No. 3: Thinking About the 
Unthinkable, 39 STAN. L. REV. 791, 794 (1987) (“Our purpose, however, is to 
provide an internal critique.”); Tamar Frankel & Frances H. Miller, The 
Inapplicability of Market Theory to Adoptions, 67 B.U. L. REV. 99, 99–103 (1987) 
(stating that economic theory is inapplicable to adoptions). 
 34. Margaret F. Brinig, The Effect of Transactions Costs on the Market for 
Babies, 18 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 553, 554 (1994). 
 35. Sue Zeidler, Internet Transforms U.S. Adoption Process, REUTERS (July 
23, 2004), https://www.smh.com.au/technology/net-transforms-us-adoption-
process-20040723-gdjef1.html (last visited Jan. 10, 2019) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 36. See ELIZABETH RALEIGH, SELLING TRANSRACIAL ADOPTION: FAMILIES, 
MARKETS, AND THE COLOR LINE 30 (2018) (‘“You know, it is a business. We provide 
a fabulous service, but at the end of the day, we are a business. Which I would 
never want you to quote, since it doesn’t sound right.’”). 
 37. Infra notes 134–146 and accompanying text. 
 38. Infra notes 134–146 and accompanying text. 
 39. Infra notes 134–146 and accompanying text. 
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bottom lines.40 They have not been responsive, however, to 
lawsuits from birth parents who seek the return of a relinquished 
child, claiming that the relinquishment was involuntary.41 These 
suits are rarely successful, with courts extremely reluctant to 
remove children from the adoptive parents they know to return 
them to biological parents who are strangers.42 Even when courts 
find that the relinquishment was involuntary, even when procured 
by fraud, courts will still conclude that it would not be in the best 
interest of the child to disrupt the adoption.43 Adoption agencies 
and their lawyers are aware of this clear trend, and will 
strategically delay the litigation to make stronger the argument 
that it would be harmful to the child to disrupt the placement.44 
Adoption agencies may well be responsive, however, to 
litigation that increases their cost of doing business and eats into 
their profit margin. This Article explores possible litigation 
strategies by birth parents and adoptees, with the long-term 
objective of changing adoption agency behavior. There have been a 
few successful lawsuits for money damages brought by birth 
parents, alleging fraud and/or tortious interference with parental 
relations.45 There may well be other successful tort claims possible, 
including legal malpractice and intentional infliction of emotional 
distress. This Article further suggests that courts should recognize 
a new cause of action for wrongful family separation in adoption. 
While such lawsuits will not result in the objective most 
desired by the birth parents—return of the child—the lawsuits 
may have a long-term effect on agency practice and thus benefit all 
birth parents in the long run. After all, one function of tort law is 
to deter bad behavior.46 Exploring the business nature of adoption 
                                                                                                     
 40. See discussion infra Part II.A (listing how adoption agencies have 
minimized risk).  
 41. Supra notes 13–24 and accompanying text.  
 42. Supra notes 13–24 and accompanying text.  
 43. Supra notes 13–24 and accompanying text. 
 44. Supra notes 13–24 and accompanying text.  
 45. See discussion infra Part II.C (listing examples of possible remedies in 
adoption lawsuits). 
 46. See John C.P. Goldberg, Twentieth-Century Tort Theory, 91 GEO. L.J. 
513, 525 (2003) (stating that the two goals of tort law are deterrence and 
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practice and suggesting litigation strategies to leverage best 
practices by adoption agencies could significantly change agency 
behavior, potentially transforming practice in adoption. 
II. The Business Model of Adoption 
You know, it is a business. We provide a fabulous service, but 
at the end of the day, we are a business. 
      —Alyssa Hollis47 
As for the children, they are subject to the same economic forces 
as automobiles or toasters. Supply and demand. Whatever the 
market will bear. 
      —Adam Pertman48 
There has long been an economic as well as child welfare 
model of adoption.49 Justifications for adoption relied on the 
economic benefit it provided to the adoptive family.50 In ancient 
Rome, adoption was a mechanism to secure services to a childless 
person51 and ensure an heir for purposes of inheritance.52 In early 
America, apprenticeship and “putting out” children for service was 
the precursor to adoption.53 “The economic ‘value’ of the child was 
                                                                                                     
compensation). 
 47. Alyssa Hollis, adoption agency director, in RALEIGH, supra note 36, at 30. 
 48. ADAM PERTMAN, ADOPTION NATION: HOW THE ADOPTION REVOLUTION IS 
TRANSFORMING AMERICA 51 (2011). 
 49. See C.M.A. McCauliff, The First English Adoption Law and Its American 
Precursors, 16 SETON HALL L. REV. 656, 656 (1986) (tracing the legal history of 
adoption from antiquity to the modern period).  
 50. See id. at 657 (“[T]he concept underlying all adoption was the 
strengthening of the adopter’s family.”).  
 51. See id. at 656 (noting that an old, childless person was permitted to adopt 
so as to have a family member to perform important memorial services for a 
family’s ancestors).  
 52. See id. at 658 (explaining how adoption “served as a will substitute”).  
 53. See ELLEN HERMAN, KINSHIP BY DESIGN: A HISTORY OF ADOPTION IN THE 
MODERN UNITED STATES 23 (2008) (“[I]ndenture was not an unusual means of 
securing children for adoption: 36 percent were eventually adopted, and those 
children indentured at young ages were far more likely to become legal members 
of the families in which they were placed.”); Susan L. Porter, A Good Home: 
Indenture and Adoption in Nineteenth-Century Orphanages, in ADOPTION IN 
AMERICA: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES 27, 27–28 (E. Wayne Carp ed., 2002) (noting 
904 76 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 895 (2019) 
 
critical under these arrangements.”54 In one early account, these 
arrangements broke down when they were a “bad bargain”—“the 
great majority of children who are returned after being placed in 
homes are returned . . . because of their inability to render a 
certain amount of services which the foster parents rightfully 
expected.”55 
Adoption was “utilized more for the economic uses of child 
labor than for the good of the children.”56 There were “free homes” 
available, “in which children received care without monetary 
compensation,” and thereby “approximated a modern adoption 
ideal founded on love rather than labor or exchange.”57 But these 
arrangements were rarer than arrangements based on 
fee-for-service or labor.58 When older children were placed in 
homes, “the reasons had at least as much to do with labor as with 
love.”59 When prospective families petitioned orphanages and child 
welfare agencies for children, “inquiries about taking in older 
children frequently specified that children would work for wages, 
experience or a combination of both.”60 One petitioner bluntly 
stated that he was requesting an adolescent girl because his 
household lacked servants.61 
The passage of the first formal adoption statute to incorporate 
the concept of “best interest of the child,” the Massachusetts 
                                                                                                     
that adoption in this era was “understood more as an offshoot of 
indenture . . . rather than as a legal arrangement based on mutual sentiment”); 
Danielle Saba Donner, The Emerging Adoption Market: Child Welfare Agencies, 
Private Middlemen, and “Consumer” Remedies, 35 U. LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 473, 
476 (1996) (“Early relationships within the adoption triad are traditionally 
characterized as economic in nature, as evidenced by the popular use of 
apprenticeship or indenture contracts well into the twentieth century.”). 
 54. Donner, supra note 53, at 476. 
 55. Id. at 476–77 (quoting RICHARD P. BARTH & MARIANNE BERRY, ADOPTION 
AND DISRUPTION: RATES, RISKS AND RESPONSES 39 (1988)). 
 56. Stephen B. Presser, The Historical Background of the American Law of 
Adoption, 11 J. FAM. L. 443, 459 (1971). 
 57. HERMAN, supra note 53, at 23. 
 58. See id. (“Many of these children were never legally adopted, however, 
and free homes were always scarcer than homes in which board was paid.”).  
 59. Id. at 24.  
 60. Id. at 26.  
 61. Id.  
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statute of 1851, is said to have marked the transition from viewing 
adoption as an economic enterprise to a child welfare enterprise.62 
Modern adoption “rejected reciprocal economic obligations as a 
bogus basis for kinship and celebrated intimacy, emotion and 
desire. In the rhetoric of modern adoption law and reform, ‘human 
values’ trumped material considerations.”63 
But Julie Berebitsky notes that language of commodification 
of children was common in adoption dialogue in the early twentieth 
century: 
For example, we see this perspective in 1924, when reformer 
Josephine Baker told readers of Ladies’ Home Journal that 
every child-caring agency she consulted emphasized that “there 
are not enough children to go around, for the demand is always 
greater than the supply.” In a slightly different vein, the 
Saturday Evening Post published “The Baby Market in 1930, 
an article that used stock market metaphors to discuss the 
growing popularity of adoption. According to the author, it was 
a “big bull market,” with “baby securities” promising “investors” 
plenty of “dividends” paid out in toothless smiles and endless 
giggles.64 
There was explicit commodification of children in the practice 
of commercial adoption at this time as well.65 “Baby farmers 
                                                                                                     
 62. See E. Wayne Carp, Introduction: A Historical Overview of American 
Adoption, in ADOPTION IN AMERICA: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES 1, 6 (E. Wayne Carp 
ed., 2002) (noting that in the quarter century after the act’s passage an additional 
twenty-four states enacted similar laws); HERMAN, supra note 53, at 21 
(describing the Massachusetts act as the “opening bell of the modern adoption 
era”). Even today, adoption still can be seen as requiring service from the adoptee. 
See RICHARD P. BARTH & MARIANNE BERRY, ADOPTION AND DISRUPTION: RATES, 
RISKS AND RESPONSES 39 (1988) 
Parents continue to require that the placement result in some kind of 
“services” although the service has changed from an economic service 
to service to the cause of family efficiency, togetherness, and 
satisfaction. In a few placements, the service is more specific—“to be a 
companion to our only son,” was the candid way one couple, who had a 
disrupted placement, described their reason for wanting to adopt an 
older child. Another adopting couple expressed the desire for a child 
“who could eventually go to Princeton.” 
 63. HERMAN, supra note 53, at 28. 
 64. JULIE BEREBITSKY, LIKE OUR VERY OWN: ADOPTION AND THE CHANGING 
CULTURE OF MOTHERHOOD, 1851–1950, at 4 (2000). 
 65. See Carp, supra note 62, at 11 (“[N]otorious adoption mills . . . accepted 
906 76 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 895 (2019) 
 
profited on both ends of child exchange, first extracting fees from 
desperate birth mothers and then demanding large sums from 
adopters.”66 Doctors and midwives at commercial maternity homes 
were paid “surrender fees” by unwed mothers and then offered the 
child for adoption for a fee from the adoptive parents.67 Children 
available for adoption were advertised in newspapers, causing 
concern among reformers that they “reduced children’s worth to 
money.”68 There were frequent incidents of baby-selling 
throughout the country starting in the 1920s, including some 
extensive organizations rather than isolated incidents.69 
Even charitably-run “amateur” adoption agencies—run by 
wealthy, philanthropic women instead of professional social 
workers—were vulnerable to charges of baby selling. Professional 
agencies did not charge fees to adoptive families at this time, while 
charitable ones “openly solicited large donations from adopters.”70 
Families of more modest means felt that wealthy prospective 
parents were able to buy children or ascend to the top of waiting 
lists because of such donations.71 One of the most infamous 
adoption-for-profit schemes in America was operated by Georgia 
Tann through the Tennessee Children’s Home and funneled 
children into the homes of celebrities and those able to pay large 
fees.72 Before the scandal was uncovered, Tann had placed at least 
                                                                                                     
payment when adoptive parents received children, ignored commonly accepted 
social work practices, and provided inadequate safeguards for everyone directly 
involved in the adoption.”). 
 66. HERMAN, supra note 53, at 36. 
 67. Id.; see Jonathan G. Stein, A Call to End Baby Selling: Why the Hague 
Convention on Intercountry Adoption Should Be Modified to Include the Consent 
Provisions of the Uniform Adoption Act, 24 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 39, 50–51 (2001) 
(noting the primacy of doctors and lawyers in the black market baby trade). 
 68. HERMAN, supra note 53, at 39; see LINDA TOLLETT AUSTIN, BABIES FOR 
SALE: THE TENNESSEE CHILDREN’S HOME ADOPTION SCANDAL x (1993) (noting that 
the selling of children was a “widespread practice” in the latter half of the 
nineteenth century).  
 69. See PERTMAN, supra note 48, at 52 (detailing two large baby-selling 
operations in Tennessee and Georgia). 
 70. HERMAN, supra note 53, at 45.  
 71. BEREBITSKY, supra note 64, at 5 (noting that these lower-income parents 
often “expressed outrage at this material evaluation of family life”). 
 72. AUSTIN, supra note 68, at 1 (describing how the scandal rocked the city 
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1,500 children illegally throughout the country,73 including into 
the Hollywood homes of Lana Turner, June Allyson, Dick Powell, 
Joan Crawford,74 and Smiley Burnette.75 It was believed that Tann 
netted around one million dollars from the scheme,76 and worked 
in conjunction with a prominent juvenile court judge to accomplish 
it.77 
Professional adoption agencies did not initially charge fees to 
adoptive parents.78 In the 1940s, social workers began to debate 
whether to charge such fees.79 Some argued in opposition that such 
fees suggested that the agencies were serving the needs of adoptive 
parents instead of needy children or impoverished birth mothers.80 
If they charged fees, would they be “faced with the charge of giving 
human life for money?”81 Others saw such fees as nothing more 
                                                                                                     
of Memphis and received extensive news coverage). See generally BARBARA 
BISANTZ RAYMOND, THE BABY THIEF: THE UNTOLD STORY OF GEORGIA TANN, THE 
BABY SELLER WHO CORRUPTED ADOPTION (2008); MADELYN FREUNDLICH, ADOPTION 
AND ETHICS: THE MARKET FORCES IN ADOPTION 5 (2000). 
 73. See AUSTIN, supra note 68, at 1 (noting also that the racket had existed 
for at least ten years); HERMAN, supra note 53, at 142–43 (“Problems included 
little advance investigation, no probationary oversight, and the exchange of large 
amounts of cash.”). 
 74. The Joan Crawford adoption was made more notorious because of the 
film Mommie Dearest, the story told from the perspective of adoptee Christina 
who was abused and traumatized by her adoptive mother. MOMMIE DEAREST 
(Paramount Pictures 1981). The movie was based on the book of the same title. 
See generally CHRISTINA CRAWFORD, MOMMIE DEAREST (1978). Crawford did not 
meet the adoption standards of the day because she was twice divorced and a 
single working mother, necessitating the illegal adoption from Georgia Tann. See 
Brian Paul Gill, Adoption Agencies and the Search for the Ideal Family, 1918–1965, 
in ADOPTION IN AMERICA: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES 160, 170–71 (E. Wayne Carp ed., 
2002) (noting that agencies largely refused to adopt children to single parents 
during this time period). 
 75. See AUSTIN, supra note 68, at 71 (noting that at the same time Tann was 
also actively lobbying the California legislature to close orphanages). 
 76. Id. at 1. 
 77. Id.; see also PERTMAN, supra note 48, at 52 (noting that Tann usually sold 
the babies to wealthy out-of-state couples for over $700 each); Stein, supra note 
67, at 51 (“Tann perpetuated her scheme by convincing birth mothers to give up 
their babies at birth in exchange for payment, including room and board.”).  
 78. See Donner, supra note 53, at 487 (accepting instead only “gratitude 
payments” from adoptive parents). 
 79. See id. (tracing the history of the debate). 
 80. See id. (explaining that many social workers resisted adoption services 
becoming an act “purely of business”).  
 81. BEREBITSKY, supra note 64, at 5. 
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than payment for services, akin to the charges other professionals 
like lawyers and doctors charged clients.82 Until 1945, professional 
adoption agencies “maintained that financial transactions between 
adopters and agencies were strictly unethical.”83 Thereafter, they 
began to charge nominal fees with the understanding that they 
represented a fee for services rather than a child’s “sticker price.”84 
Even today, large adoption fees in the U.S. raise questions: 
Big money threatens to undermine the confidence that 
prospective parents and the general public must have if 
adoption is to fit comfortably into America’s cultural mosaic, 
without people developing a new set of negative views about the 
process. When the sums involved are so large, they also can blur 
the vision—and raise questions about the motive—of 
well-intentioned professionals.85 
A social worker voiced concern about high fees today, saying, 
“The one thing that really bothers me is the amount of money 
exchanged. . . . I am afraid on some level, how much of those 
expenses cover real services, and how much does it feed an 
industry?”86 
One of the arguments for charging fees for adoption services 
was that adoptive parents would prefer the “businesslike” footing 
fee-for-services would place them on: “[It] mirrored interactions in 
other areas of their lives. Whereas the recipient of charity was 
powerless, a couple paying a fee acquired the power of the 
consumer, which enabled them to demand better service from the 
agency.”87  
This new view of adopters as fee-paying consumers, coupled 
with the growing consumer rights movements in the U.S., 
                                                                                                     
 82. See id. at 5 (noting that social work was becoming increasingly 
recognized as a legitimate profession at this time). 
 83. HERMAN, supra note 53, at 45. 
 84. BEREBITSKY, supra note 64, at 5. 
 85. PERTMAN, supra note 48, at 51. 
 86. RALEIGH, supra note 36, at 59. 
 87. BEREBITSKY, supra note 64, at 5; see also JUDITH S. MODELL, KINSHIP WITH 
STRANGERS: ADOPTION AND INTERPRETATIONS OF KINSHIP IN AMERICAN CULTURE 51 
(1994) (noting the view that adoption became a service for infertile couples rather 
than a service for needy children). 
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empowered prospective adoptive parents to see themselves “as 
equal to agencies or as their adversary.”88 “Adoptive 
applicants . . . demanded that agencies treat them as informed 
consumers rather than passive beneficiaries.”89 An adoption 
researcher writing in 1966 noted a change in prospective adoptive 
parents’ “perception of their consumer’s right to determine in part 
their treatment, and their organization and use of political 
activity.”90  
Part of the shift toward a consumer approach to adoption was 
a focus on remedies available to adoptive parents when adoptions 
failed.91 Starting in the 1920s, there was statutory authority 
permitting adoptive parents to nullify an adoption if a child 
exhibited “feeble-mindedness” or insanity, as if breaching some 
implied warranty.92 But those statutes were largely repealed in the 
1960s and 1970s.93 But starting in the 1980s, courts began to 
recognize another consumer remedy in the tort of wrongful 
adoption.94 
Not only did prospective adoptive parents begin to see 
themselves as consumers in a commercial transaction with 
agencies, agencies began to see their enterprise as market-driven 
as well. In a fascinating recent study focused on adoption workers, 
Dr. Elizabeth Raleigh interviewed adoption social workers and 
                                                                                                     
 88. Donner, supra note 53, at 494 (quoting Elizabeth S. Cole, Societal 
Influences on Adoption Practice, in ADOPTION: CURRENT ISSUES AND TRENDS 15, 18 
(Paul Sachdev ed., 1984)). 
 89. Id. at 500. 
 90. Id. at 500 n.202 (quoting IRIS GOODACRE, ADOPTION POLICY AND PRACTICE 
24 (1966)); see also RALEIGH, supra note 36, at 8 (describing situations when “the 
parent paying the bills becomes the de facto client”). 
 91. See Donner, supra note 53, at 510 (noting that choosing the remedies for 
failed adoptions “evokes an equally important moral versus market discourse”). 
 92. Id. (explaining that these statutes were potentially inspired by the 
eugenics theories that “pervaded” the adoption practice during the period). 
 93. See id. at 513 (noting that only a few jurisdictions continue to even “claim 
to reserve” the right to annul an adoption (citing Ann Harlan Howard, Annulment 
of Adoption Decrees on Petition of Adoptive Parents, 22 J. FAM. L. 549, 550 (1984))). 
 94. The first case to recognize the cause of action was Burr v. Board of 
County Commissioners, 491 N.E.2d 1101, 1107 (Ohio 1986) (“It would be a 
travesty of justice and a distortion of the truth to conclude that deceitful 
placement of this infant, known by appellants to be at risk, was not actionable 
when the tragic but hidden realities of the child’s infirmities finally came to 
light.”). 
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other agency personnel about their roles at the cross-section of 
business interests and child welfare.95 While social workers will 
assert that adoption is child-focused, they must recognize that they 
“operate under a model of client services in which the revenue that 
they take in from paying customers forms the foundation of their 
organization’s long-term solvency.”96 Social workers spoke frankly 
about non-child welfare factors the agencies considered in deciding 
“which children get served and why.”97 One explained with regard 
to international adoption: “There are tons of kids in need of homes 
in places where social workers don’t want to go work in or where it 
is going to be too expensive.”98 The social worker continued, “We 
are opening and closing programs to see which ones we can afford. 
It is an industry at the end of the day, I suppose.”99 
Dr. Raleigh notes that the market focus of adoption agencies 
has become more acute in the past decade as the adoption 
marketplace has changed with reduced availability of the babies 
and toddlers that adoption consumers were interested in 
adopting.100 When adoption was booming, agencies “were less 
interested in the financial considerations involved in sustaining a 
small business. . . . these workers did not have to worry about 
paying the rent or making payroll.”101 Now, with the downturn in 
adoption, the focus has to shift—as one worker put it, “This is a 
business, and we have to make business decisions.”102 
Dr. Raleigh’s research is suggestive of the amenability of 
adoption agencies to the same profit-driven decision-making as 
other businesses. One element of business decision-making is 
avoiding costly litigation.103 When courts began to recognize the tort 
                                                                                                     
 95. See generally RALEIGH, supra note 36. 
 96. Id. at 2. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. at 3.  
 99. Id. 
 100. See id. at 4 (noting that the drop in international babies available for 
adoption has been especially pronounced).  
 101. Id.  
 102. Id. 
 103. See Schweitzer & Pollack, supra note 27, at 258 (stating that litigation 
risk is a factor affecting adoption agency behavior). 
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of wrongful adoption, adoption agencies significantly changed their 
practices to avoid such lawsuits.104 If faced with new litigation risks 
from other sources—birth parents and adoptees— adoption agencies 
could be nudged into better practices to respect their rights going 
forward. The next Part of this Article will examine that history of 
responsiveness to adoptive parent suits for wrongful adoption before 
turning to theories of legal liability that might serve as grounds for 
birth parents and adoptees to subject agencies to legal risk. 
III. Adoptive Parents Suing Agencies—Wrongful Adoption 
I didn’t want to have to stand up in any courtroom and say, “I 
wouldn’t have chosen this child.” . . . How do you say that to your 
son—I never would have adopted you? 
    —Phyllis Juman105 
 Adoption has long been perceived as risky for adoptive 
parents.106 There was a strain of eugenics thinking and focus on 
heritability of bad character that often chilled interest in 
adoption.107 “Strong beliefs in behavioral heredity—the children of 
                                                                                                     
 104. See Donner, supra note 53, at 517 (noting that recognition of the tort of 
wrongful adoption “set the stage for a remarkable transformation in adoption 
practice”). 
 105. Mother who ultimately sued agency for wrongful adoption, speaking 
about her reluctance to do so. Lisa Belkins, What the Jumans Didn’t Know About 
Michael, N.Y. TIMES (March 14, 1999), 
https://www.nytimes.com/1999/03/14/magazine/what-the-jumans-didn-t-know-
about-michael.html (last visited Jan. 10, 2019) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review). 
 106. See Sandra Sufian, As Long as Parents Can Accept Them: Medical 
Disclosure, Risk, and Disability in Twentieth-Century American Adoption 
Practice, 94 BULL. HIST. MED. 94, 97 (2017) (noting that the adoption service has 
long struggled with how much information prospective parents should receive 
about an adopted child’s medical history). 
 107. See Donner, supra note 53, at 483–84 (noting that one commentator 
stated that to put a “mental defective” in a home that expected a “normal child” 
was a “social crime”). Prominent eugenicists of the 1920s and 1930s opposed 
adoption outright. See HERMAN, supra note 53, at 31 (“Anxieties regarding 
eugenics were a prominent feature of the antiadoption climate.”). To adopt 
children with mental defects, according to one famous eugenicist, was to 
“contaminate the gene pool.” Id. He was, however, willing to condone “risky” 
placements as long as the adoptive parents “were committed to keeping their 
children from marrying to avoid transmitting the ‘defective’ trait.” Sufian, supra 
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women who had sex out of wedlock were thought to have ‘bad 
blood,’ and consequently, ‘blood will tell.’ Adoptive parents would 
be saddled with children genetically predisposed to bad behaviors 
‘which cause family heartache.’”108 “Race, religion, physical health, 
mental health, criminality, educability, sexual morality, 
intelligence and temperament were all associated with blood.”109 
Prominent eugenicists of the 1920s and 1930s opposed adoption 
outright.110 To adopt children with mental defects, according to one 
famous eugenicist, was to “contaminate the gene pool.”111 He was, 
however, willing to condone “risky” placements as long as the 
adoptive parents “were committed to keeping their children from 
marrying to avoid transmitting the ‘defective’ trait.”112 
A. Agencies Mitigating Risk 
To minimize the risk, adoption agencies undertook to screen 
children for adoptability.113 In one child-placing manual for social 
workers, the author cautioned, “to put a low grade mental defective 
in a family home where a normal child was expected 
is . . . inexcusable in a well-ordered and progressive child-placing 
agency.”114 Preadoption investigation of a child’s current health 
and heritable factors was considered crucial to “avoiding the error 
of placing unqualified children.”115 According to this thinking, 
agencies were looking to place only “the perfect child with the 
                                                                                                     
note 106, at 99. 
 108. Seymore, supra note 7, at 112 (citing ELLEN HERMAN, KINSHIP BY DESIGN: 
A HISTORY OF ADOPTION IN THE MODERN UNITED STATES 29–30 (2009)). 
 109. HERMAN, supra note 53, at 30. 
 110. See id. at 64 (basing much of this concern on the “quality” of available 
children). 
 111. Id. at 65. 
 112. Sufian, supra note 106, at 99; ELLEN HERMAN, KINSHIP BY DESIGN: A 
HISTORY OF ADOPTION IN THE MODERN UNITED STATES 65–66 (2008). 
 113. See Gill, supra note 74, at 166–67 (noting that both would-be adopters 
and adoptees had to meet the agency’s approval). 
 114. Donner, supra note 53, at 484 (quoting WILLIAM H. SLINGERLAND, 
CHILD-PLACING IN FAMILIES: A MANUAL FOR STUDENTS AND SOCIAL WORKERS 69 
(1919)). 
 115. HERMAN, supra note 53, at 64. 
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perfect background.”116 “Cradle adoptions,” those adoptions of very 
young infants, were considered especially risky since the babies 
were being placed before there was sufficient time to evaluate their 
mental fitness.117 One well-known adoption agency was criticized 
for keeping newborns for as little as forty days for observation, “an 
observation period considered dangerously short by social workers 
who stressed the enormous risks.”118 Eugenicists advised that 
parents should, if possible, only take the child “on approval,” to 
avoid the risk of adopting a “bad seed.”119 
Preadoption screening of the child was the method for 
reducing the risk inherent in the eugenics view of adoption.120 By 
the 1920s, it was believed that tests for intelligence and physical 
health were sufficiently accurate as to assure prospective adoptive 
parents that they were not participating in “a grab-bag” 
“eugenically speaking.”121 One orphanage physician was confident 
of his ability to screen out the risk, bragging that in all his 
experience with a great many adoptions, “I have yet to know one 
where the parents regretted the adoption.”122 It was one’s biological 
children who presented the risk, he opined, not “the child who can 
be inspected and passed upon by competent authority.”123  
                                                                                                     
 116. See Donner, supra note 53, at 488; HERMAN, supra note 53, at 30 
(explaining that adoptive parents and facilitators believed that “only normal, 
healthy children were suitable candidates for adoption”). 
 117. See HERMAN, supra note 53, at 66 (detailing several examples of adopted 
children eventually diagnosed with various mental and health problems). 
 118. Id. 
 119. See id. (noting that this risk was one of adoption’s “most obvious risks”).  
 120. See FREUNDLICH, supra note 72, at 5 (stating that the screening included 
intelligence and physical health tests); Gill, supra note 74, at 167 (noting the 
types of screenings some argued agencies should use to keeping “defective” 
children off the adoption market).  
 121. See FREUNDLICH, supra note 72, at 5 (noting that the most desirable 
children at the time were baby girls with blue eyes and blonde hair); Sufian, supra 
note 106, at 104 (noting prevailing beliefs that testing of children even under one 
year of age could accurately account for mental and psychological abilities). 
 122. HERMAN, supra note 55, at 42.  
 123. Id.; see Gill, supra note 74, at 168 (explaining that “agencies ‘were 
convinced and attempted to convince the public that they could guarantee them 
a perfect child . . . and adopting a child was a far less risky procedure than having 
one normally,’” according to Joseph Reid, Executive Director of the Child Welfare 
League of America). 
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Still, as a hedge against the risk, one agency would place a 
child with an uncertain genetic history only if the adoptive parents 
would sign a binding agreement to return the child “if and when 
abnormal characteristics appeared.”124 A right of rescission of an 
adoption decree if a child, unknown at the time of adoption, 
suffered from “retardation, epilepsy, insanity, venereal disease, 
and so on” became a part of statutory law as early as the 1920s.125 
While courts were generally reluctant to nullify adoptions, they 
would do so because they felt it was in the long-term interest of 
adoption as an institution—the possibility of annulment if the 
child fails to satisfy would make adoptive parents more willing to 
adopt in the first instance.126 By the 1960s, however, most of these 
rescission statutes had been repealed, and agencies were 
reconfiguring their ideas of which children were adoptable.127 
B. Adoptive Parents and Assumption of the Risk 
The market in adoption had changed once again, with more 
couples looking to adopt post-World War II: 
The American eugenics movement tapered off, taking with it 
notions of biological determinism that had deterred adoption. 
Adoptive parents were offered an image of “transplanted 
flowers” that would thrive in the new family, and not revert to 
                                                                                                     
 124. See HERMAN, supra note 55, at 65 (noting that some agencies offered 
written assurance of a right of return of the unsatisfactory child). 
 125. See id. at 171 (stating that state laws frequently allowed this kind of 
annulment); Donner, supra note 53, at 510 (noting that these statutory schemes 
likely reflected the concern for eugenics at the time).  
 126. See Donner, supra note 53, at 511–12 (discussing how some courts used 
a Posnerian theory and treated the adoption process as if it had a warranty). 
 127. See id. at 513 (citing Ann Harlan Howard, Annulment of Adoption 
Decrees on Petition of Adoptive Parents, 22 J. FAM. L. 549 (1984)); John R. Maley, 
Note, Wrongful Adoption: Monetary Damages as a Superior Remedy to Annulment 
for Adoptive Parents Victimized by Adoption Fraud, 20 IND. L. REV. 709, 715 
(1987) (noting that the purpose of recent legislative trends “is to make no 
provision for annulment of the adoption”); Susan Kempf LeMay, The Emergence 
of Wrongful Adoption as a Cause of Action, 27 J. FAM. L. 475, 481 (1988) (noting 
that most annulment statutes have been repealed and that at the time the article 
was written, only California allowed adoption annulment based on the child’s 
physical or mental condition). 
ADOPTING CIVIL DAMAGES 915 
the “bad blood” of the birth parents. The importance of 
parenting—especially mothering—emerged with the post-war 
baby boom. Infertile couples wanted in on the baby boom, and 
with less concern that behavior was biologically determined, 
adoption became an appealing option.128  
“Perfect” children were not as numerous as the families 
seeking to adopt, so agencies changed their focus to finding the 
right family for a child, rather than finding the perfect child for a 
family.129 Rather than ensuring against risk for adoptive parents, 
willingness to accept the risk of a less-than-perfect child became 
the hallmark of an acceptable adoptive parent.130 A prospective 
parent who balked at “the risks of reasonable unknowns” might 
not be the kind of parent capable of unconditional love necessary 
for adoption.131 Under this view, there were some agencies that felt 
that “nothing should be told to adoptive parents regarding a child’s 
background.”132 Not all agreed, but there were ongoing 
disagreements among adoption professionals about “what 
constitutes information that is dangerous or not necessary to 
share.”133 
In 1932, the adoption standards of the Child Welfare League 
of America (CWLA) provided that if there were risks involving a 
particular child, there should be disclosure so that “the adoptive 
parents thoroughly understand the child’s condition and needs.”134 
                                                                                                     
 128. Seymore, supra note 7, at 114; see ELAINE TYLER MAY, BARREN IN THE 
PROMISED LAND: CHILDLESS AMERICANS AND THE PURSUIT OF HAPPINESS 127–49 
(1995) (discussing the villainization of childless adults in the post-World War II 
era and post-war “baby craze”). 
 129. See Donner, supra note 53, at 490 (discussing the child centered 
approach to adoption matching); Sufian, supra note 106, at 106 (noting that the 
new philosophy following World War II considered the child’s right to have a 
stable home). 
 130. See Donner, supra note 53, at 490 (discussing the adoptive screening 
criteria that includes the prospective parents’ ability to “accept a child 
wholeheartedly while knowing the risks” (internal citations omitted)). 
 131. See id. (noting that this ability to weigh risks was seen as a sign that the 
prospective parents were “normal” and “well-adjusted”).  
 132. See id. (quoting the sentiment expressed at the Child Welfare League’s 
1955 Annual Conference). 
 133. See id. n.129 (quoting MICHAEL SCHAPIRO, A STUDY OF ADOPTION 
PRACTICE 87 (1956)). 
 134. CHILD WELFARE LEAGUE OF AM., STANDARDS FOR ADOPTION SERVICE 24 
(1932); Sufian, supra note 106, at 99.  
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A physician warned in a 1937 Journal of the American Medical 
Association article that withholding information about a child’s 
health and genetic risk “is tantamount to fraud,” and that agencies 
would subject themselves to professional liability for their failure 
to disclose.135  
But by the 1950s, agencies and adoption professionals had 
begun to restrict the information about health and social history 
shared with adoptive parents.136 The CWLA standards had 
changed by 1959 to advise agencies not to provide “information 
which is not relevant to the child’s development and would only 
arouse anxiety.”137 Social workers would provide “only ‘selected 
background material,’ with all ‘sordid or irrelevant’ details 
deleted,” believing that “sharing only favorable information would 
assist the child in building a sense of positive self-esteem.” 138 
Adoptive parents also did not need to hear negative information: 
“Irrelevant or unverified information (which included background 
medical and genetic information) was of little benefit to the 
parent-child relationship, and such information could cause 
damage by arousing anxiety and apprehension.”139 
Given the prevailing notion that parents should accept the 
risk inherent in adoption, courts generally rejected suits for money 
damages for wrongful adoption.140 In a 1958 case where the 
adoptive parents sought to annul an adoption and also sought 
“monetary damages from [an adoption agency] for medical costs 
                                                                                                     
 135. See Sufian, supra note 106, at 102 (discussing the physician’s opinion 
that adoption agencies must manage, amount other things, “the risk of 
professional liability”). 
 136. See MADELYN FREUNDLICH & LISA PETERSON, WRONGFUL ADOPTION: LAW, 
POLICY & PRACTICE 2 (1998) (stating that two dynamics were at work: concerns 
about the stigma for adopted children and the adoptive parents’ reluctance to 
discuss adoption with adopted children). 
 137. CHILD WELFARE LEAGUE OF AM., supra note 134, at 27. 
 138. See FREUNDLICH & PETERSON, supra note 136, at 3 (noting that social 
workers “largely rejected recommendations that background information be 
completely withheld” (internal citations omitted)).  
 139. Id.  
 140. See John Gibeaut, Disclosing Birth Secrets: More States Allow Adoptive 
Parents’ Suits when Agencies Lie, 84 A.B.A.J. 34, 35 (1998) (“The first courts to 
confront wrongful adoption claims were leery of letting the genie too far out of the 
bottle.”). 
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incurred in caring for the child,” the court simply ignored the plea 
for money damages.141 Two decades later, two California courts 
refused to recognize causes of action in tort against adoption 
agencies.142 The tide was about to turn again, however, with social 
workers once again announcing that best practices required full 
disclosure by adoption agencies—“In 1978, CWLA again revised its 
adoption standards in response to these practice developments. 
The 1978 standards deleted references to withholding adverse 
information and emphasized the importance of providing adoptive 
parents with the child’s developmental, medical, and genetic 
history . . . .”143 
Despite the embrace of full disclosure of standards by adoption 
professionals, the actual practice did not mirror these idealized 
expectations.144 Madelyn Freundlich, who literally wrote the book 
on wrongful adoption, states, “Although there may be a desire to 
consider failures to disclose as unusual deviations from standard 
agency practice, research suggests otherwise.”145 In one study, 
more than one-third of adoptive parents were not informed of a 
history of physical abuse and over one-half were not told of a child’s 
history of sexual abuse.146 Freundlich suggests multiple reasons 
for the failure of agencies to follow best practices on disclosure, 
from a fear that prospective adoptive parents will be scared away 
                                                                                                     
 141. See Allen v. Allen, 330 P.2d 151, 154–57 (Or. 1958) (affirming that there 
is no right to set aside adoptions unless a statute says otherwise without 
discussing the appellants’ petition for compensation for medical costs); Maley, 
supra note 127, at 716 (noting that “the Oregon Supreme Court held that absent 
statutory authority on the subject, the adoptive parents have no right to set aside 
adoptions, even in cases of fraud”).  
 142. See Richard P. v. Vista Del Mar Child Care Serv., 106 Cal. App. 3d 860, 
866 (1980) (finding that the adoption agency disclosed all the facts about the 
child’s health as they existed when the agency placed the child with the plaintiffs); 
Smith v. Alameda Cty. Soc. Servs. Agency, 90 Cal. App. 3d 929, 941–43 (1979) 
(finding no valid claim for public policy reasons and because “the injury and 
damages are highly uncertain in terms of their nature, cause and existence”); see 
also LeMay, supra note 127, at 478–79 (discussing the Richard P. case). 
 143. FREUNDLICH & PETERSON, supra note 136, at 5.  
 144. See infra notes 145–146 and accompanying text (discussing research that 
suggests a significant portion of adoptive parents are not informed of their 
adoptive child’s history of abuse).  
 145. FREUNDLICH & PETERSON, supra note 136, at 8.  
 146 See id. at 8 (discussing RICHARD P. BARTH & MARIANNE BERRY, ADOPTION 
AND DISRUPTION: RATES, RISKS AND RESPONSES (1988)). 
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by negative information to their failure to secure the needed 
information from birth parents to fully disclose.147 One 
commentator has suggested that when the only remedy was 
annulment of the adoption, rather than money damages, agencies 
weren’t incentivized to follow better practices: 
Still another downfall of the remedy is its inherent lack of 
deterrent value against future fraudulent practices. If, for 
instance, an adoption home misrepresents a child’s 
background . . . an annulment proceeding merely requires the 
home to take over the care of the child until another adoption is 
perfected. Although this may inconvenience the home and force 
it to incur additional expense and paperwork, it is unlikely that 
it will bring about increased scrutiny of potential future 
abuses.148 
But as courts began to impose legal liability for wrongful 
adoption and legislatures began to mandate disclosure, agencies 
showed better compliance with disclosure rules.149 
C. Remedies when Risk was Realized 
1. The Courts Respond 
Ohio became the first state to recognize the tort of wrongful 
adoption.150 It was a small opening: the Ohio Supreme Court 
                                                                                                     
 147. See id. at 9–10 (listing other reasons including breakdowns in 
communication because of high turnover at agencies and lack of access from 
sending countries).  
 148. Maley, supra note 127, at 718.  
 149. See id. at 711 (“Future acts of adoption fraud are also more likely to be 
deterred under the wrongful adoption theory because the wrongdoers will be 
subject to monetary liability for the damages they inflict.”).  
 150. See Burr v. Bd. of Cty. Commissioners, 491 N.E.2d 1101, 1107 (Ohio 
1986) (finding that the public adoption agency had to “be held accountable for 
injuries resulting from the deceitful and material misrepresentations which [the 
court found] were foreseeably and justifiably relied on by appellees”); see also 
Maley, supra note 127, at 710 (discussing the Burr case as a “novel case”); D. 
Marianne Brower Blair, Getting the Whole Truth and Nothing But the Truth: The 
Limits of Liability For Wrongful Adoption, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 851, 854 (1992) 
(noting that the Ohio Supreme Court was the first court “to recognize a right to 
compensatory damages against an adoption agency for misrepresentations to 
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warned, “In no way do we imply that adoption agencies are 
guarantors of their placements. Such a view would be tantamount 
to imposing an untenable contract of insurance that each child 
adopted would mature to be healthy and happy. Such matters are 
solely in the hands of a higher authority.”151 Only in the face of “the 
deliberate act of misinforming this couple,” not mere failure to 
disclose the inherent risks, could a suit be successful.152 
a. Fraud and Deliberate Misrepresentation 
In 1964, the Burrs adopted a seventeen-month-old boy on the 
representation from the agency that he “was a nice big, healthy, 
baby boy” who had been born at the local hospital to an 
eighteen-year-old mother who had been living with her parents.153 
In reality, the birth mother was a thirty-one-year-old patient at a 
mental hospital, as was the presumed father, and the child was 
actually born at the mental hospital.154 When the boy developed 
Huntington’s disease, a fatal, progressive, hereditary neurological 
condition, the adoptive parents sued to recoup medical expenses in 
excess of $80,000.155 The attorneys for the Burrs coined the term 
“wrongful adoption,” labeling their initial pleading, “Complaint in 
Fraud and Reimbursement of Expenses for Wrongful Adoption.”156 
Mr. Burr testified at trial that he would never have adopted the 
boy if he had known his biological parents were mental patients: 
“If I had been handed the true facts and been given a right to make 
up my mind, ‘cause all the woman would have had to said to me 
was that the parents was in Massillon State Hospital and I would 
                                                                                                     
adoptive parents concerning their child’s medical history”).  
 151. See Burr, 491 N.E.2d at 1109 (discussing the difference between failure 
to inform inherent risks and deliberately misinforming potential adoptive parents 
about a child’s health).  
 152. See id. (affirming the lowers court’s judgment in favor of the adoptive 
parents).  
 153. See id. at 1103 (discussing the agency’s fraudulent statements).  
 154. See id. (discussing the contents of previously sealed records).  
 155. See id. (noting that the adoptive parents brought a civil suit against the 
public adoption agency).  
 156. See Maley, supra note 127, at 710 n.9 (noting that the term had not be 
used by any appellate court in the country before Burr).  
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have never never seen this child.”157 Finding the elements of fraud 
were met with the agency’s outright misrepresentations, the court 
upheld the jury’s $125,000 verdict.158  
While Burr involved deliberate misinformation, courts soon 
began to recognize wrongful adoption when there was deliberate 
concealment as well.159 In Juman v. Louise Wise Services,160 for 
example, a New York adoption agency was sued for failing to 
disclose to adoptive parents their child’s birth mother’s long 
psychiatric history, including a lobotomy.161 They had not lied, like 
the agency in Burr, but their failure to disclose what they knew led 
to liability.162 Fraud is still the most common theory of liability in 
wrongful adoption cases.163 
b. Negligent Misrepresentation 
Later courts recognized the tort of wrongful adoption not just 
when agencies were deliberately deceptive, but also when they 
                                                                                                     
 157. See Burr, 491 N.E.2d at 1106 n.3 (including Mr. Burr’s direct testimony 
as a footnote in the opinion).  
 158. See id. at 1109 (affirming the lower’s court’s judgement for the adoptive 
parents).  
 159. FREUNDLICH & PETERSON, supra note 136, at 13 (noting that these claims 
must still establish the elements of fraud).  
 160. 608 N.Y.S.2d 612 (1994). 
 161. See id. at 613–14 (discussing plaintiffs’ suit to recover damages for their 
adoptive son’s medical treatment). For a deep dive into the sad history of Michael 
Juman, see Lisa Belkins, What the Jumans Didn’t Know About Michael, N.Y. 
TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/1999/03/14/magazine/what-the-jumans-didn-t-
know-about-michael.html (last visited Jan. 2, 2019) (discussing Michael’s story 
and his desire to learn more about his birth mother) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review). 
 162. See Juman, 608 N.Y.S.2d at 617 (noting that the agency had the 
statutory obligation to disclose information about the child’s birth mother to the 
adoptive parents); see also Michael J. v. L.A. Cty. Dep’t. of Adoptions, 201 Cal. 
App. 3d 859, 863–64 (1988) (recognizing a cause of action for deliberate 
concealment of the known fact that the child’s port-wine birthmark was a 
symptom suggestive of a serious degenerative nerve disorder). 
 163. See D. Marianne Blair, A Closer Look at Theories of Liability: 
Possibilities and Pitfalls, in JOAN HEIFETZ HOLLINGER, 2 ADOPTION LAW AND 
PRACTICE § 16.03 (2015) (noting the prevalence of fraud in wrongful adoption suits 
and explaining that the elements set forth in Burr are the elements used in most 
jurisdictions).  
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were negligent regarding information sharing.164 The first case to 
move from fraud to negligence as the basis for the cause of action 
was from Wisconsin.165 The agency falsely told prospective 
adoptive parents that their child had no more risk of contracting 
Huntington’s disease than any other child since his birth father 
had tested negative for the disease, despite the fact his 
grandmother had the disease.166 The family later learned that 
there was no accurate test for Huntington’s disease, and when the 
adopted child was diagnosed with Huntington’s, the parents sued 
the agency for $10 million.167 The court was careful to note that the 
agency’s liability was not because of a failure to learn about the 
child’s condition, but rather, “CSS affirmatively misrepresented 
Erin’s risk of developing Huntington's Disease. The agency 
assumed the duty of informing the Meracles about Huntington’s 
Disease and about Erin's chances of developing the disease. 
Having voluntarily assumed this duty, . . . CSS negligently 
breached it.”168 Thus, agencies could avoid liability under this legal 
theory “by refraining from making any representations at 
all . . . .”169 Remaining silent was not enough for liability 
avoidance, however, as some courts began to impose an affirmative 
                                                                                                     
 164. See FREUNDLICH & PETERSON, supra note 136, at 16 (noting that 
negligent agency conduct may have been just as harmful to adoptive parents as 
purposeful deception); Gibeaut, supra note 140, at 35 (describing how a Montana 
agency failed to inform adoptive parents that the child’s biological mother had 
mental disabilities that required professional help). Courts have not gone so far 
as to recognize wrongful adoption where the agency has failed to investigate a 
child’s background. See Blair, supra note 163, § 16.03[2][b] (listing the elements 
of negligent misrepresentation).  
 165. See FREUNDLICH & PETERSON, supra note 136, at 16 (discussing the 
history of negligent adoption cases). 
 166. See Meracle v. Children’s Serv. Soc., 437 N.W.2d 532, 533 (Wis. 1989) 
(describing the adoptive parent’s discussion with the agency’s social worker 
regarding the child’s biological family’s history of Huntington’s Disease and the 
child’s risk of developing the disease). 
 167. See id. (noting how the adoptive family discovered the truth about the 
disease through a television program, the child’s subsequent diagnosis, and the 
parent’s decision to sue the agency).  
 168. See id. at 537 (emphasizing that this case was unique because it did not 
involve a duty to discover and disclose); see also M.H. v. Caritas Family Servs., 
475 N.W.2d 94, 96–100 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991) (finding that the agency disclosed 
incest in child’s background, but did so incompletely and thus negligently), rev’d 
in part, aff’d in part, 488 N.W.2d 282 (Minn. 1992). 
 169. FREUNDLICH & PETERSON, supra note 136, at 16.  
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duty to disclose information in the possession of the agency.170 In 
Roe v. Catholic Charities,171 the agency incurred liability for failing 
to disclose what they knew about serious behavioral problems 
(including that one child had stomped to death a dog of a former 
foster family).172  
c. Damages 
Wrongful adoption claims have resulted in significant money 
damages under a number of different theories.173 The most 
common recoveries are for extraordinary medical expenses that 
adoptive parents have incurred and anticipate incurring in the 
future because of the wrongful adoption.174 Also available are the 
costs of travel, lodging, and special equipment associated with 
medical care.175 Lost wages associated with increased care needs 
are also recoverable.176 Damages for emotional distress and loss of 
consortium have been successfully sought.177 One commentator 
notes that damages for physical injury are available “if the adopted 
                                                                                                     
 170. See id. at 20 (noting that this approach was a shift).  
 171. 588 N.E.2d 354 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992).  
 172. See id. at 356 (discussing the defendant agency’s knowledge of an 
adoptive child’s destructive, violent behavior). In a similar vein, see Jackson v. 
Montana, 956 P.2d 35, 40 (Mont. 1998) (describing the agency’s failure to disclose 
an adopted child’s family history of mental illness); McKinney v. Washington, 950 
P.2d 461, 465 (Wash. 1998) (discussing Washington state agency’s statutory duty 
to disclose a potential adoptee’s relevant medical and social information). 
 173. See infra notes 174–183 and accompanying text (discussing the variety 
of wrongful adoption claims).  
 174. See Blair, supra note 163, § 16.05 (acknowledging that courts have 
“readily agreed such damages are compensable”). 
 175. See FREUNDLICH & PETERSON, supra note 136, at 25 (listing the variety of 
damages that plaintiffs might seek in a wrongful adoption case).  
 176. See id. (stating that lost wages occur “when adoptive parents must 
provide the extra care that a child needs”); Blair, supra note 163, § 16.05 
(discussing various courts’ use of lost wages in the damages calculation).  
 177. See FREUNDLICH & PETERSON, supra note 136, at 25 (noting that some 
jurisdictions only allow damages for emotional distress when the distress 
manifests into physical ailments); Blair, supra note 163, § 16.05 (explaining that 
adoptive parents often seek emotional distress damages, but noting the 
limitations).  
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child harms an adoptive parent or a sibling.”178 In Young v. Van 
Duyne,179 the adoptive father sued the adoption agency for the 
wrongful death of his wife, beaten to death with a baseball bat by 
their adoptive son.180 Agencies have been liable for punitive 
damages as well, where the agency acted wantonly and/or 
willfully.181 When the adoption agency in Ross v. Louise Wise 
Services, Inc.182 sought to strike a prayer for punitive damages in 
a case involving their failure to disclose birth parents’ history of 
schizophrenia, the court responded: “This court finds that, under 
the facts presented, a jury could conclude that defendant’s acts 
were ‘morally culpable’ or ‘actuated by evil or reprehensible 
motives’ and that punitive damages are warranted to deter other 
adoption agencies from engaging in similar acts of deceit in the 
future.”183 
Damages awarded can be significant.184 In one case, a jury 
awarded $3.8 million for psychiatric care for the plaintiffs’ adult 
daughter (though the court reduced the award to $200,000 because 
of statutory limits imposed by a state tort reform statute.)185 A 
California case included lifetime care for a psychiatric condition, 
and resulted in a settlement for $1.45 million.186 In the 
LEXISNEXIS database “Verdict & Settlement Analyzer,” a 
handful of cases are reported for wrongful adoption, including 
                                                                                                     
 178. FREUNDLICH & PETERSON, supra note 136, at 25. 
 179. 92 P.3d 1269 (N.M. Ct. App. 2004). 
 180. See id. at 1271 (noting that an adoptive father alleged that the adoption 
agency knew or should have known that the adopted child was violent and in need 
of therapeutic support).  
 181. FREUNDLICH & PETERSON, supra note 136, at 25 (noting that this happens 
in some jurisdictions); Blair, supra note 163, § 16.05174 (listing several instances 
in which courts have awarded punitive damages).  
 182. 777 N.Y.S.2d 618 (2004).  
 183. See id. at 623 (denying the agency’s motion to dismiss the adoptive 
parents’ demand for punitive damages). 
 184. See infra notes 185–188 (discussing instances in which courts have 
awarded damages in the hundreds of thousands or even million dollar range).  
 185. See Mohr v. Commonwealth, 653 N.E.2d 1104, 1106 n.4 (Mass. 1995) 
(finding that this amount would “fairly and adequately compensate the 
plaintiffs”).  
 186. See Blair, supra note 163, § 16.05 n.3 (describing Trial Brief, Forter v. 
Cty. of San Mateo, No. 33207 (Cal. Super. Ct. July 6, 1992)).  
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some stating simply that there was a confidential settlement.187 
One case reports a recovery through jury verdict of $300,000.188 
2. Legislatures Respond 
As tort claims for wrongful adoption were recognized by 
courts, legislatures also acted to mandate disclosures by adoption 
agencies.189 The Texas statutes, for example, require the 
preparation of a Health, Social, Educational, and Genetic History 
Report by the placing entity and that it be provided to the 
prospective adoptive parents “as early as practicable before the 
first meeting of the adoptive parents with the child.”190 The statute 
contains a long list of information that should be included in the 
report, including birth and neonatal history; current physical 
health; birth mother’s use of alcohol during pregnancy; family 
relationships with siblings, birth parents and extended family; 
educational performance and special education needs, if any; 
physical, sexual or emotional abuse suffered by the child; and a 
litany of information about birth parents, extended family and 
siblings deemed “genetic history”: 
(1) their health and medical history, including any genetic 
diseases and disorders; 
(2) their health status at the time of placement; 
(3) the cause of and their age at death; 
(4) their height, weight, and eye and hair color; 
(5) their nationality and ethnic background; 
                                                                                                     
 187. See, e.g., Wallerstein v. Chandler, No. 85 17406-04, 2009 Jury Verdicts 
LEXIS 135482 (settling for a confidential amount); Martin v. Methodist Home & 
Newman, No. 90-07815-A, 2009 Jury Verdicts LEXIS 90435 (June 1994) (settling 
for an undisclosed amount). 
 188. See Halper v. Jewish Family & Children’s Serv. of Greater Phila., 2009 
Jury Verdicts LEXIS 198796 (March 2004) (listing the verdict); Halper v. Jewish 
Family & Children’s Serv. of Greater Phila., 963 A.2d 1282, 1289 (Pa. 2009) 
(reinstating the verdict). 
 189. See FREUNDLICH & PETERSON, supra note 136, at 33–34 (stating that 
these statutes have been in place in most states since the 1980s and discussing 
the content of the statutes).  
 190. TEX. FAM. CODE §162.005 (2017). 
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(6) their general levels of educational and professional 
achievements, if any; 
(7) their religious backgrounds, if any; 
(8) any psychological, psychiatric, or social evaluations, 
including the date of the evaluation, any diagnosis, and a 
summary of any findings; 
(9) any criminal conviction records relating to a misdemeanor 
or felony classified as an offense against the person or family or 
public indecency or a felony violation of a statute intended to 
control the possession or distribution of a substance included in 
Chapter 481, Health and Safety Code; and 
(10) any information necessary to determine whether the child 
is entitled to or otherwise eligible for state or federal financial, 
medical, or other assistance.191 
The report is to be retained for ninety-nine years so that it can 
be supplied not just to the adoptive parents, but also to adopted 
persons on reaching adulthood as well as the children of adopted 
persons.192 The statutes further provide that prospective adoptive 
parents who indicate that they are interested in proceeding with 
the adoption after reviewing the agency-prepared report may also 
see the child’s case record, and the agency “shall provide the 
prospective adoptive parents with access to research regarding 
underlying health issues and other conditions of trauma that could 
impact child development and permanency.”193 The Uniform 
Adoption Act also mandates disclosure of a report about the 
adoptee’s current physical and mental health, as well as 
educational, social and genetic history.194 The comment to this 
section describes the disclosure requirements as “the Act’s most 
significant contributions to the improvement of contemporary 
adoption practice.”195 The Act goes on to provide sanctions for 
failure to disclose: civil penalties that “can be imposed against 
                                                                                                     
 191. Id. § 162.007(d). 
 192. See id. § 162.006 (mandating who does and does not have authority to 
access to health records). 
 193.  See id. § 162.0062 (c-1) (2017) (discussing the prospective adoptive 
parents’ rights to information about the child during the adoption process). 
 194. See UNIF. ADOPTION ACT § 2-106 (1994) (suggesting that the birth parents 
provide this report as early as practicable and before the adoptive parent accepts 
physical custody of the child). 
 195.  UNIF. ADOPTION ACT § 2-106 cmt. (1994).  
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agencies, lawyers, evaluators, and other providers of professional 
services who fail to perform their responsibilities according to a 
generally acceptable standard of care.”196 In addition to civil fines, 
the Act acknowledges “wrongful adoption” causes of action: an 
adoptive parent “may maintain an action for damages or equitable 
relief against a person . . . who fails to perform the duties required 
by” the disclosure sections of the Act.197  
D. Agencies Respond to New Legal Risk 
At least one adoption physician warned as early as 1937 that 
withholding information about a child’s health and genetic risk “is 
tantamount to fraud,” and that agencies would subject themselves 
to professional liability for their failure to disclose.198 But without 
a duty to disclose, legally acknowledged by tort liability for 
wrongful adoption and imposed by legislatures via statutory 
disclosure, agencies did not have the incentive to follow better 
practices.199 Disclosure practices today have improved 
considerably as agencies respond to the risk of legal liability: 
“These rulings, accompanied by state statutes that variously 
determine the extent and kind of medical histories that must be 
collected and disclosed, have led adoption agencies subsequently to 
become extremely conscious about the legal liability and ethical 
ramifications of disclosure practices.”200 Organizations that offer 
                                                                                                     
 196.  UNIF. ADOPTION ACT § 7-105 cmt. (1994). 
 197. See UNIF. ADOPTION ACT § 7-105(c) (1994) (extending the availability of 
damages for wrongful adoption to any person to whom the birth parents were 
supposed to disclose information to under the Act). 
 198. See Sufian, supra note 106, at 102 (reviewing cases where adoptive 
parents became disconcerted with their adopted child after learning of the child’s 
family medical history). 
 199. See Maley, supra note 127, at 718 (arguing for legislative reform because 
the traditional remedy of an annulment of the adoption had little deterrent effect 
and was seldom used due to the harsh effects on the child). 
 200. See Sufian, supra note 106, at 122 (noting that the imposition of damages 
as the remedy for wrongful adoption lawsuits increased awareness about the 
issues caused by nondisclosure of pertinent information). 
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education for agencies now emphasize the legal liability in failure 
to disclose.201  
“The possibility of being sued is . . . one of the factors affecting 
agency behavior. The desire to minimize exposure to liability is a 
constant reality.”202 Dr. Raleigh notes that the market focus of 
adoption agencies has become more acute in the past decade as the 
adoption marketplace has changed with reduced availability of the 
babies and toddlers that adoption consumers were interested in 
adopting.203 When adoption was booming, agencies “were less 
interested in the financial considerations involved in sustaining a 
small business . . . .these workers did not have to worry about 
paying the rent or making payroll.”204 Now, with the downturn in 
adoption, the focus has to shift—as one worker put it, “This is a 
business, and we have to make business decisions.”205 Part of the 
business decision-making has to be reducing litigation risk.206 The 
need to avoid liability for wrongful adoption has already changed 
agency practice with regard to information sharing.207 But there 
                                                                                                     
 201. See, e.g., Michele Jackson, Agency Liability: What Adoption Service 
Providers and Families Need to Know, ADOPTION ADVOCATE NO. 73 (July 1, 2014), 
http://www.adoptioncouncil.org/publications/2014/07/adoption-advocate-no-73 
(last visited Apr. 23, 2019) (“An adoption agency may be found liable for false 
statements or for not attempting to obtain information that and/or should have 
been known.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Wrongful 
Adoption Litigation and Practice, ADOPTIVE & FOSTER FAM. COALITION, 
https://affcny.org/adoption/legal-issues/disclosure-of-information/wrongful-
adoption-litigation-practice/ (last visited Apr. 23, 2019) (advising agencies on 
avoiding liability) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 202. Schweitzer & Pollack, supra note 27, at 258. 
 203. See RALEIGH, supra note 36, at 4 (“[T]he number of children 
available— especially overseastrickled to a halt.”); see also Dana E. Prescott & 
Gary A. Debele, Shifting Ethical and Social Conundrums and “Stunningly 
Anachronistic” Laws: What Lawyers in Adoption and Assisted Reproduction May 
Want to Consider, 30 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. L. 127, 141 (2017) (“Modern 
adoption . . . cases present practitioners with particularly challenging ethical 
dilemmas and liability risks.”). 
 204. See RALEIGH, supra note 36, at 4 (noting that, before this shift, many 
adoption workers were drawn to the field because of their commitment to child 
welfare). 
 205. See id. (stating that the cause of this change is due to new regulations 
and a decrease in the number of young and healthy babies). 
 206. See Blair, supra note 150, at 855–56 (discussing the need for adoption 
agencies to reduce risk since courts began to impose liability for failure on the 
part of the agencies to provide essential information on the child’s history). 
 207. See Blair, supra note 163, § 16.03 (“Claims against adoption 
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are other areas where wrongful agency practice persists.208 Other 
theories of liability, subjecting agencies to litigation risk for 
wrongful family separation, could incentivize better treatment of 
birth parents.209 This Article now turns to exploration of that 
potential liability. 
IV. Legal Liability for Wrongful Family Separation 
Tort law is our primary fallback method of empowering 
ordinary people to remedy injustices to themselves through 
their courts. 
      —Jack B. Weinstein 210 
There is no named tort of wrongful family separation as yet, 
but there are a number of potential causes of action to address 
agencies who defraud birth parents or interfere with parental 
rights.211 Procuring consent to adoption by fraud, duress or 
coercion could create a cause of action similar to the fraud and 
misrepresentation actions in wrongful adoption.212 Infliction of 
                                                                                                     
intermediaries seeking damages for misconduct in the disclosure of health-related 
information have been brought under a variety of legal theories.”). 
 208. See Jennifer Emmaneel, Note, Beyond Wrongful Adoption: Expanding 
Adoption Agency Liability to Include a Duty to Investigate and a Duty to Warn, 29 
GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV. 181, 181–83 (1999) (outlining adoption agency’s liability 
for fraudulent and negligent misrepresentations and failures to investigate 
possible issues with the child’s medical background).  
 209. See Elizabeth J. Samuels, Time to Decide? The Laws Governing Mothers’ 
Consents to the Adoption of Their Newborn Infants, 72 TENN. L. REV. 509, 526–39 
(2005) (advocating agency best practices in adoption procedures to ensure 
informed consent from biological mothers by providing counseling services, 
reducing conflicts of interest, and encouraging legal representation for the 
biological parents). 
 210. Jack B. Weinstein, The Role of Judges in a Government of, by, and for 
the People: Notes for the Fifty-Eighth Cardozo Lecture, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 243 
(2008). 
 211. See Gibbs v. Ernst, 647 A.2d 882, 889 (Pa. 1994) (recognizing fraud and 
intentional misconduct as causes of action in the adoption context). 
212.See In re Zschach, 665 N.E.2d 1070, 1078 (Ohio 1996) (stating that a 
biological parent’s consent is not voluntary, and thus not valid, if given under 
duress or coercion). 
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emotional distress causes of action also seem applicable.213 And 
several courts have recognized the tort of interference with 
parental rights in cases of adoption.214 Attorneys who facilitate 
adoptions might also be subjected to liability for legal malpractice 
or other wrongdoing.215 Finally, states may wish to adopt a new 
cause of action for wrongful family separation.216 
A. Fraud and Misrepresentation217 
Fraud corrupts whatever it touches—the dishonesty involved in 
fraud simply cannot be condoned. 
      —Saul Litvinoff218 
In adoption, “consents may be set aside in all jurisdictions for 
fraud, duress, or undue influence.”219 As one court put it, 
                                                                                                     
 213. See Ross v. Louise Wise Servs., 868 N.E.2d 189, 191 (N.Y. 2007) 
(acknowledging that a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional 
distress can exist in wrongful adoption cases, although here it was barred by the 
statute of limitations). 
 214. See Coward v. Wellmont Health Sys., 812 S.E.2d 766, 770–71 (Va. 2018) 
(outlining a four-factor test for intentional interference with parental rights in 
the adoption context); Jenkins v. Miller, No. 2:12-cv-184, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
160793, at *27 (D. Vt. Sept. 29, 2017) (“[T]ortious interference with parental 
rights constitutes a cause of action cognizable in this state.”). 
 215. See Prescott & Debele, supra note 203, at 131 (noting that adoption 
lawyers increasingly face substantial risk). 
 216. See Sonja Starr & Lea Brilmayer, Stefan A. Reisenfeld Symposium 2002: 
Family Separation as a Violation of International Law, 21 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 
213, 218–19 (2003) (discussing the right to keep the family together as a 
recognized right under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other 
international treaties). 
 217. Fraud encompasses a wide variety of deceitful and false conduct. It may 
encompass both intentional and negligent misrepresentation. See Frank J. 
Cavico, Fraudulent, Negligent, and Innocent Misrepresentation in the 
Employment Context: The Deceitful, Careless, and Thoughtless Employer, 20 
CAMPBELL L. REV. 1, 3 (1997) (noting that misrepresentation can be categorized 
as intentional fraudulent misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation, 
careless misrepresentation, or innocent misrepresentation). 
 218. Saul Litvinoff, Vices of Consent, Error, Fraud, Duress and an Epilogue 
on Lesion, 50 LA. L. REV. 1, 66 (1989). 
 219. Samuels, supra note 209, at 512; see KATHERINE G. THOMPSON & JOAN H. 
HOLLINGER, 2 ADOPTION LAW AND PRACTICE § 8.02 (2015) (discussing the rights of 
adoptive parents, biological parents, and stepparents to set aside adoption in the 
event of defective consent). 
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The Private Adoption Act of 1979 does not provide for any 
method whereby the act of surrender may be set aside because 
of vitiated consent. However, the executed act of surrender, 
although highly regulated and specialized, is in essence a 
contract, namely an agreement by two or more parties whereby 
obligations are created, modified, or extinguished. Accordingly, 
as in other agreements, the consent necessary to the surrender 
of a child for private adoption may be vitiated by error, fraud or 
duress.220 
When fraud induces consent, “though consent has come into 
existence, it is impaired, defective, it is tainted by a vice that 
affects its freedom.”221 In order for consent to adoption to be valid, 
it must be voluntary.222 The same kind of fraud that should lead to 
invalidation of consent could serve as the basis of a fraud 
lawsuit.223 
Even when the consent is invalid because of fraud or duress, 
courts are extremely reluctant to order the child removed from the 
adoptive parent and returned to the biological parent: 
Most jurisdictions will not allow a revocation to halt an adoption 
proceeding automatically if the adoptive parents oppose the 
revocation, even though the notice of revocation met all the 
statutory requirements. Instead, the attempted withdrawal of 
consent will trigger a hearing to determine whether the 
statutory grounds exist for an involuntary termination of 
parental rights, to the text of the note or whether a return of 
                                                                                                     
 220. See In re J.M.P., 528 So. 2d 1002, 1007–08 (La. 1988) (discussing whether 
the eighteen-year-old birth mother’s family’s refusal to allow her to bring the baby 
home was akin to duress, vitiating the mother’s consent to relinquish her parental 
rights). 
 221. Litvinoff, supra note 218, at 6.  
 222. See Seymore, supra note 7, at 150 (“Relinquishment of parental rights 
and consent to adoption must be knowingly and voluntarily given.”); Samuels, 
supra note 209, at 511 (noting that a widely-accepted goal of infant adoption is to 
ensure that the birth parents’ decisions are deliberate); 2 AM. JUR. 2D, Adoption 
§ 23, Westlaw (database updated Feb. 2019) (noting that voluntary consent is 
jurisdictional). 
 223. See Harriet Dinegar Milks, Annotation, “Wrongful Adoption” Causes of 
Action Against Adoption Agencies Where Children Have or Develop Mental or 
Physical Problems That Are Misrepresented or Not Disclosed to Adoptive Parents, 
74 A.L.R. 5th Art. 1 (1999) (discussing influential wrongful adoption cases where 
the causes of action were grounded in the elements of fraud). 
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the child to the biological parents is in the best interests of the 
child.224 
The case of J.M.P. illustrates the need for a cause of action for 
money damages in adoption cases.225 Though the birth mother 
validly withdrew her consent to the adoption within the thirty days 
permitted by statute, that did not guarantee the return of her 
child.226 The court simply stated, “the withdrawal of consent will 
not prevent the adoption if the adoption is found to be in the best 
interests of the child.”227  
A classic case of fraud in the inducement of consent in the 
adoption context is Vela v. Marywood.228 Corina, age nineteen and 
unmarried, approached an adoption agency when she discovered 
she was pregnant.229 Corina was a college student, and was 
described by the appellate court as “an exemplary young woman” 
from “a strong, stable, and supportive family.”230 When receiving 
counseling from Marywood, a child-placing agency, Corina was 
adamant that she wanted open adoption231 and Marywood said it 
was able to provide that for her.232 Marywood offered, as a standard 
                                                                                                     
 224. THOMPSON & HOLLINGER, supra note 219, § 8.02(1)(a)(i). 
 225. See In re J.M.P., 528 So. 2d at 1007–08 (acknowledging that the only 
remedy available for an act of surrender made under duress is to set aside the act 
and remove the child from the adoptive parents’ custody if removal is in the child’s 
best interests). 
 226. See id. at 1021 (Calogero, J., dissenting) (“[The biological mother] did in 
fact revoke her consent to the surrender within thirty days of signing the act.”). 
 227. See id. at 1014 (noting the court’s preference for consideration of the 
child’s best interests in adoption proceedings). 
 228. See Vela v. Marywood, 17 S.W.3d 750, 761 (Tex. Ct. App. 2000) (finding 
that the adoption agency owed to the biological mother a duty to disclose and was 
bound to act in good faith in regards to her interests). 
 229. See id. at 753 (“In September 1997, Corina, then nineteen years of age 
and unmarried, learned she was pregnant.”).  
 230. See id. (discussing Corina’s educational accomplishments, volunteer 
experience, and family background). 
 231. See id. (noting that Corina expressed the type of couple she wanted her 
unborn child would go to and her desire to maintain a relationship with the child 
after adoption). “Open adoption,” also known as post-adoption contact, can 
include any number of different kinds of contact, from anonymously-shared 
letters and photographs throughout the child’s lifetime to occasional-to-frequent 
in-person visits. See Seymore, supra note 7, at 151 (acknowledging that the 
amount of contact a biological parent may have with the child through an open 
adoption agreement varies by state). 
 232. See Vela, 17 S.W.3d at 753 (“Corina reported . . . that she had bonded 
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practice, a “sharing plan,” where adoptive parents agree to allow 
the birth mother to visit the child after the termination of her 
parental rights.233 The arrangement is, however, an “empty 
promise,” as Marywood admitted, since it is wholly 
unenforceable.234 Marywood failed to mention the unenforceable 
nature of the agreement.235 That “empty promise” was 
compounded by statements made by her counselor shortly after the 
baby’s birth at the hospital that Corina “’would always be able to 
visit her baby’ and that her baby would always know that Corina 
was his mother.”236 Corina cried throughout that visit.237  
When Corina tried to withdraw her consent to adoption and 
regain possession of her child, the agency refused.238 The trial court 
                                                                                                     
with her unborn child . . . and discussed what Marywood terms an ‘open 
adoption.’”). 
 233. See id. at 754 (“A sharing plan ostensibly allows the birth mother to 
select the adoptive family, visit her child on a regular basis after the adoption, 
and exchange letters and pictures.”). 
 234. See id. (noting that while the adoptive parents agree in writing to 
conform to the arrangement, the birth mother does not sign the agreement, so 
neither the adoptive parents nor Marywood are in an agreement with the birth 
mother). 
 235. See id. (“[T]he executive director of Marywood admits that the sharing 
plan is an ‘empty promise.’”). As I explained in a previous article, “it is common 
practice in states without enforceable open-adoption agreements, however, for 
agencies and adoptive parents to enter into such unenforceable ‘agreements.’” 
Seymore, supra note 7, at 152. I reviewed agency websites in states where open 
adoption agreements are not enforceable and found many promises of continuing 
contact. See id. (“The birth parents may not be aware that the openness promised 
by these agencies may not be legally binding.”). One agency, for example, 
promised much like Marywood: “arrangements can be made with the assistance 
of Spirit of Faith Adoptions to stay in touch with your child’s adoptive parents 
throughout his/her lifetime.” Id. at 152. The websites were all silent on the fact 
that no such agreements were legally enforceable in their jurisdictions. See id. at 
152–53 (discussing that, even where open adoption agreements are enforceable 
in a certain state, the adoption agency websites failed to disclose that such 
agreements have complex legal requirements to make them judicially 
enforceable). 
 236. See Vela, 17 S.W.3d at 755 (noting that the counselor made similar 
statements in a meeting shortly after the child’s birth promising Corina that she 
would always be in the child’s life). 
 237. See id. (discussing the one and a half hour visit where Corina ultimately 
signed a temporary foster-care request). 
 238. See id. at 756 (discussing a phone call where Corina claims she told her 
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upheld the adoption, and Corina appealed.239 The appellate court 
found fraud.240 The agency committed fraud because of its failure 
to disclose the unenforceability of the open adoption agreement.241 
Marywood “owed Corina a duty of complete disclosure when 
discussing adoption procedures, including any proposed 
post-adoption plan.”242 The agency had an obligation to fully 
disclose “the whole truth” about the open-adoption agreement, 
including the fact that it was not binding.243 Further, the court 
held, the agency held a position of superiority and influence over 
the birth mother who placed special confidence in them “by virtue 
of the counseling relationship.”244 The court noted the vulnerability 
of “a young unmarried mother considering placement of her child 
for adoption,” entitled her to a “‘higher obligation’ when she 
confides in a maternity counselor.”245 
Corina’s case is unusual in one respect (the fraud was 
unfortunately typical)—the court concluded that the fraud vitiated 
her consent, and that she was, therefore, entitled to return of her 
child.246 In another jurisdiction, return of the child might well have 
been blocked by a “best interest of the child” analysis247 that 
privileged the fact that the child had been with the prospective 
                                                                                                     
counselor “she wanted [her] baby back” and had “changed [her] mind”). 
 239. See id. at 752 (noting that the termination order was placed before 
Corina’s counsel could intervene and Corina appealed the district court’s 
judgment). 
 240. See id. at 765 (concluding that the adoption agency owed the expectant 
mother a high standard of care which it did not uphold when it did not disclose 
the unenforceability of the open adoption agreement). 
 241. See id. at 754 (stating that even the executive director of Marywood that 
the open adoption agreement is essentially an empty promise). 
 242. Id. at 761. 
 243. See id. (emphasizing that the birth mother placed special confidence in 
the adoption agency). 
 244. See id. at 765 (stating that this higher standard applies as soon as the 
expectant mother undertakes counseling with the adoption service). 
 245. Id. at 761. 
 246. See id. at 765 (finding that, because the relinquishment waiver was not 
voluntarily signed by the mother, her parental rights were never terminated). 
 247. See THOMPSON & HOLLINGER, supra note 219, § 8.02(1)(a)(i) (discussing 
situations where the biological parents revoke consent to the adoption within the 
statutory requirements, but the court will still require a “best interests” hearing 
to determine whether the biological parents can regain custody of the child). 
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adoptive parents for two years during the course of the litigation.248 
In such a jurisdiction, the adoption agency should face legal 
liability and money damages for fraudulent misrepresentation.249 
“Fraud consists [of] deception practiced in order to induce 
another to part with property or surrender some legal right.”250 
The Restatement (Second) of Torts provides:  
One who fraudulently makes a misrepresentation of fact, 
opinion, intention or law for the purpose of inducing another to 
act or to refrain from action in reliance upon it, is subject to 
liability to the other in deceit for pecuniary loss caused to him 
by his justifiable reliance upon the misrepresentation.251 
The well-established elements of a fraud cause of action are as 
follows: “(1) a false representation; (2) in reference to a material 
fact; (3) made with knowledge of its falsity; (4) with the intent to 
deceive; and (5) on which an action is taken in justifiable reliance 
upon the representation.”252 
As the court in Vela noted, an adoption agency serving 
vulnerable women at a point of crisis owes a duty easily breached 
when seeking to secure consent to adoption.253 False promises of 
continued contact amounted to fraud.254 Promising the birth 
                                                                                                     
 248. See Vela v. Marywood, 17 S.W.3d 750, 759 (Tex. Ct. App. 2000) (stating 
that Texas law requires a relinquishment affidavit and a finding that termination 
is in the best interest of the child before the court terminates parental rights). 
The court notes that though “the child is now two years of age and has spent 
almost his entire life with the prospective adoptive parents . . . any fault lies with 
the pace of the legal system and not with the mother,” and ordered return of the 
child. Id at 765. 
 249. See infra notes 274–278 (discussing the loss of or interference with 
parental rights as being appropriate for an award of money damages). 
 250. Reid v. Landsberger, 123 Conn. App. 260, 281 (2010). 
 251. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §525 (AM. LAW INST. 1977). 
 252. 37 AM. JUR. 2D Fraud and Deceit § 24, Westlaw (database updated Feb. 
2019). 
 253. See Vela, 17 S.W.3d at 761 (emphasizing that the adoption agency’s 
position of superiority and influence over the young, biological mother placed 
upon the agency a duty to act in good faith in regard to the mother’s interests). 
 254. See id. (noting that the adoption agency owed, yet failed to perform, a 
duty of full disclosure to the biological mother, including a duty to explain that 
the continued contact agreement was not legally enforceable). Courts have 
reached similar results when the birth father consents after false promises of 
continuing contact were made. See, e.g., In re Interest of S.A.B., No. 04-01-00795, 
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mother that the child would be placed with her cousin constituted 
fraud.255 In Huebert v. Marshall,256 the birth mother was deceived 
by a woman who was emotionally involved with the baby’s father 
into consenting to an adoption.257 The mother did not know that 
the woman and the baby’s father had planned to get together after 
the father left her.258  
 In In re Cheryl E.,259 the court found fraud where the adoption 
worker falsely told the mother that if she signed the 
relinquishment she could have the child returned to her within one 
year if she wished, but that if she did not sign, the child would be 
given to her estranged husband and his girlfriend.260 The court 
noted that the agency’s intent to defraud the mother was evident 
from the fact that the worker made false representations with the 
knowledge that the mother would rely on them, regardless of 
whether the worker knew they were actually false.261 The worker 
                                                                                                     
2002 Tex. App. LEXIS 5053, at *9 (Tex. App. July 17, 2002) (“[F]raudulent 
representations made to a party to induce the party into executing an affidavit of 
relinquishment constitute extrinsic fraud.”); Queen v. Goeddertz, 48 S.W.3d 928, 
932 (Tex. App. 2001) (noting that an affidavit of relinquishment will be considered 
involuntary if procured by fraud). 
 255. See Jones v. Tex. Dep’t of Protective & Regulatory Servs., 85 S.W.3d 483, 
491 (Tex. App. 2002) (noting that the Department promised the birth mother that 
her cousin would care for the child and she would be able to see the child where, 
in reality, the Department gave the child to strangers and the birth mother had 
no right to visit the child (citing Vela v. Marywood, 17 S.W.3d 750 (Tex. App. 
2000))). 
 256. 270 N.E.2d 464 (Ill. App. Ct. 1971). 
 257. See id. at 467 (discussing the woman’s representations to the birth 
mother that the adoptive parents were good people and would make good parents 
despite the fact that the woman had only casually spoken with the adoptive 
parents). The court noted that the woman “was acting in a fiduciary capacity 
because of [the biological mother]’s total trust in her,” and “violated that trust 
because she was secretly involved with [the biological mother]’s husband.” Id.  
 258. See id. at 465 (discussing the timeline of events following the birth of the 
child, specifically that the biological mother was aware her husband was planning 
to leave her, but she did not know he would do so with the woman persuading her 
to give her child up for adoption). 
 259. 161 Cal. App. 3d 587, 599 (1984). 
 260. See id. at 596–99 (affirming the trial court’s finding that the adoption 
worker either explicitly told the mother she could have her daughter returned to 
her or made statements causing the mother to reasonably believe she had a year 
to change her mind). 
 261. See id. at 599 (“[R]epresentations need not be made with knowledge of 
actual falsity, but need only be a false assertion of fact by one who has no 
reasonable grounds for believing his own statements to be true, and made with 
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had “no reasonable grounds for believing his own statements to be 
true,” and were made with the intent to induce the mother to 
consent.262 The mother justifiably relied on the agency’s 
representations, to her detriment.263  
Courts have also held that “undue influence and overreaching 
are species of fraud and will vitiate a transaction,” and found fraud 
where the birth mother was overwhelmed by the agency and 
over-persuaded to consent.264 One court noted the following factors 
characterize undue influence and over-persuasion: “(1) Discussion 
and consummation of the transaction in an unusual place; (2) 
insistent demand that the business be finished at once; (3) extreme 
emphasis on untoward consequences of delay; and (4) absence of 
third party advisors to the servient party.”265 So where adoption 
was first suggested by the unwed mother’s doctor who shared her 
Adventist faith and who called an Adventist adoption agency in 
another state for her, and where she moved to that other state at 
the behest of the agency and was surrounded by Adventist church 
members who worked to get her to consent to adoption, the court 
found undue influence.266 In another case, after the mother decided 
to keep her child, the maternity home embarked on a course of 
                                                                                                     
intent to induce the other to alter his position, to his injury.”). 
 262. See id. (noting that it is irrelevant whether the adoption worker knew or 
believed the mother had one year to change her mind and reclaim her child). 
 263. See id. at 600 (“Implicit in the trial court’s finding that [the mother] 
relinquished her child for adoption as a result of fraud is the inference that she 
would not have relinquished her child but for the fraud.”).  
 264. See Sorentino v. Family & Children’s Soc., 367 A.2d 1168, 1169 (N.J. 
1976) (finding the adoption agency exerted unwarranted pressure on the mother 
when an adoption worker threatened her with harassment and litigation if she 
did not relinquish parental rights); Methodist Mission Home v. N.A.B., 451 
S.W.2d 539, 544 (Tex. App. 1970) (noting that the adoption agency “subjected [the 
mother] to an intensive campaign, extending over a five-day period, designed to 
convince her to give up her baby”); In re Interest of Perry, 641 P.2d 178, 180 
(Wash. Ct. App. 1982) (finding undue influence where every time the mother 
expressed uncertainty about giving up her child, the adoption agency provided 
counseling to encourage her to sign the relinquishment papers).  
 265. See In re Cheryl E., 161 Cal. App. 3d at 601 (relying on factors to find 
undue influence because direct evidence of it is rarely obtainable). 
 266. See In re Perry, 641 P.2d at 181 (“[T]his environment created in [the 
mother’s] mind an obligation, without option, to repay the agency’s expenses by 
relinquishing her rights to her child.”). 
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conduct to persuade her to relinquish the child for adoption.267 She 
was told that she was being selfish, and had no right to keep the 
child.268 She was advised that the child would be a burden to her 
and that she would find it difficult to secure a husband, and that if 
she did find a husband, he would resent the child.269 The worker 
asked her “what [she] would do when, some day in the future, her 
son returned home from school and asked, ‘Mommy, what’s a 
bastard?’”270 The mother testified that the interviews happened 
over a five day period immediately after the birth of her child, and 
that the period was a “nightmare” where she was only sleeping 
three hours a night.271 The court noted “the fact that an unwed 
mother who has just given birth is usually emotionally distraught 
and peculiarly vulnerable to efforts, well-meaning or 
unscrupulous, to persuade her to give up her child.”272 
All of the cases discussed above, where the court found fraud, 
led to rescission of consent.273 But the facts and law of these cases 
                                                                                                     
 267. See Methodist Mission Home, 451 S.W.2d at 541 (discussing the Home’s 
counseling policy to encourage unwed women to give up their children rather than 
to discuss their options). 
268.See id. at 542 n.7 (detailing the conversations between the mother and the 
adoption worker where the adoption worker tried to persuade the mother to give 
her child up for adoption). 
 269. See id. (noting that the adoption worker told the mother she was 
unaware of any unwed mother happy with her decision to keep her child). 
270.See id. (discussing one counseling session where the adoption worker told the 
mother a story about another unwed mother whose child asked her the meaning 
of “bastard”).  
 271. See id. at 543–44 (“She testified that, as a result of her discussions with 
[the adoption worker], she felt ‘trapped,’ and that . . . she consented to the 
adoption of her child to avoid ‘harassment.’”). 
 272. Id. at 544. 
 273. See Sorentino, 367 A.2d at 1170 (stating that the trial judge had 
sufficient evidence for his finding that the agency coerced the mother into 
relinquishing her child after she expressed her desire to keep the child); Vela v. 
Marywood, 17 S.W.3d 750, 764 (Tex. App. 2000) (holding the relinquishment 
affidavit void because the mother signed it based on misrepresentations by the 
agency that she would have an enforceable open adoption agreement with the 
adoptive parents); Methodist Mission Home, 451 S.W.2d at 544 (concluding that 
the evidence was sufficient for the jury to find the adoption agency exercised 
undue influence over the mother when she executed agreements to surrender 
custody of her newborn child); In re Perry, 641 P.2d at 181 (noting that the undue 
influence by the adoption agency was exacerbated by the fact that the expectant 
mother spent the last months of her pregnancy completely surrounded by and in 
the care of the agency). 
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also support the kind of fraud that gives rise to civil liability for 
damages.274 But how would damages be calculated in such cases? 
“Proof of damages is essential in an action for fraud or deceit, and 
generally, the loss or injury must be a pecuniary injury or an 
economic loss. However, it is generally sufficient if the fraud has 
resulted in the loss of a right which the law recognizes as of 
pecuniary value.”275 The right of parenthood is clearly a right 
which the law recognizes as of pecuniary value.276 Cases of tortious 
interference with parental rights lead to pecuniary damages,277 as 
do cases involving the wrongful death of a child.278 Further, many 
frauds in the adoption context involve breach of a fiduciary duty 
owed by the agency or adoption workers, and “in some 
jurisdictions, a cause of action may be made for a breach of 
fiduciary duty even without actual damages or the showing of an 
economic loss.” 279 And fraudulent inducement cases are not subject 
to the economic loss doctrine. 280 Indeed, in some jurisdictions “a 
                                                                                                     
 274. See 37 AM. JUR. 2D Fraud and Deceit § 346, Westlaw (database updated 
Feb. 2019) (“Because fraud of all kinds is abhorrent to the law, if one person is 
injured by the fraud of another, the courts have jurisdiction to afford a proper 
remedy.”). 
 275. Id. § 266. 
 276. See McCurdy v. Dodd, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2333, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 
28, 2000) (bringing a claim for pecuniary damages for loss of parenthood against 
the police officers who shot and killed her child). 
 277. See infra note 278 (discussing parents’ claims for damages after the loss 
of their child). 
 278. See 10 PERSONAL INJURY—ACTIONS, DEFENSES, DAMAGES § 45.08[11] 
(stating that the measure of damage in wrongful death of a child includes “the 
parents’ loss of the pecuniary value of the child’s earnings and services during 
minority, less the cost of maintaining the child during that period, plus 
contributions reasonably to be expected after the child reaches majority”). 
“However, some courts have not permitted the expense of rearing and educating 
the child to be used as a setoff, and other courts have limited the loss for the death 
of a minor to the period of the child’s minority.” Id.; see also Wangen v. Ford Motor 
Co., 294 N.W.2d 437, 466 (Wis. 1980) (holding that parents of an injured child can 
recover punitive damages incident to their action for compensatory damages). 
 279. See 37 AM. JUR. 2D Fraud and Deceit, § 268, Westlaw (database updated 
Feb. 2019) (stating that the requirement to show actual damages sustained from 
fraudulent actions may vary by jurisdiction). 
 280. See id. § 270 (“[C]laims for the tort of fraudulent inducement are not 
barred by the economic loss doctrine.”); R. Joseph Barton, Drowning in a Sea of 
Contract: Application of the Economic Loss Rule to Fraud and Negligent 
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non-compensable violation of a legally protected right” 281 is enough 
to trigger nominal damages, and once nominal damages are 
awarded, punitive damages are supported. 282 Fraud can also give 
rise to non-economic damages, including emotional distress.283 
Fraud actions can give rise to punitive damages.284 Where 
there is a fiduciary duty, “punitive damages can be awarded when 
the defendant violates a fiduciary duty owed to the plaintiff.”285 In 
cases where the courts describe the vulnerable state of birth 
mothers, and their reliance on adoption agencies and workers, they 
                                                                                                     
Misrepresentation Claims, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1789, 1803–11 (2000) 
(discussing the applicability of the economic loss rule to fraud claims in various 
jurisdictions, noting that several jurisdictions find fraudulent inducement claims 
to be in conflict with the economic loss doctrine). 
 281. See 37 AM JUR 2D, supra note 274, § 269 (noting that recovery for fraud 
requires more than a showing of nominal damages); First Bank of Boaz v. Fielder, 
590 So. 2d 893, 898 (Ala. 1991) (“Punitive damages may be awarded by the jury 
in a fraud action if the plaintiff makes a sufficient evidentiary showing that he 
has been injured as a result of the fraud and that the defendant’s conduct 
warrants punishment.”). 
 282. See AM JUR 2D, Damages, § 570, Westlaw (database updated Feb. 2019) 
(observing that once actual damages, even nominal damages, are established, 
some jurisdictions may award punitive damages it is a proper case to do so); 
Fielder, 590 So. 2d at 898 (finding that although the jury’s award of punitive 
damages to the plaintiffs was not accompanied by nominal or compensatory 
damages, this was not grounds to set aside the verdict because there was 
sufficient evidence that the plaintiffs were harmed, at least nominally, by the 
defendant’s fraudulent acts). 
 283. See Andrew L. Merritt, Damages for Emotional Distress in Fraud 
Litigation: Dignitary Torts in a Commercial Society, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1, 31 (1989) 
(“Rather than ignoring the claims of fraud plaintiffs who have suffered 
substantial frustration or severe emotional distress, courts should recognize that 
fraud is at least in part a dignitary tort and should award damages for that 
distress.”); Steven J. Gaynor, Annotation, Fraud Actions: Right to Recover for 
Mental or Emotional Distress, 11 A.L.R. 5th 88 (1995) (noting that some courts 
have held that a wrongdoer should be held liable for all the “ordinary, natural, 
and proximate consequences of his actions,” including those that caused the 
plaintiff “shame, humiliation, and mental anguish”); see, e.g., McGhee v. McGhee, 
353 P.2d 760, 764 (Idaho 1960) (noting that plaintiff could recover damages for 
humiliation, disgrace, and mental anguish in husband’s failure to disclose he was 
already married). 
 284. See 4 DAMAGES IN TORT ACTIONS § 40.03 (“Most jurisdictions impose 
punitive damages for conduct that evinces malice, fraud, oppression, or willful 
and wanton disregard of the rights and safety of others.”); 1-9 PUNITIVE DAMAGES 
§ 9.7 (“Generally, the court will award punitive damages in fraud cases if the 
plaintiff shows that the defendant committed the misrepresentation with a 
malicious or willful intent.”). 
 285. 1-9 PUNITIVE DAMAGES § 9.7. 
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are using language of fiduciary duty: “courts regularly impose 
fiduciary obligations ad hoc in relationships where one person 
trusts another and becomes vulnerable to harm as a result.”286 
B. Tortious Interference with Parental Rights 
In a previous article, I noted that thwarted birth fathers had 
had some success in bringing lawsuits for tortious interference 
with parental rights.287 Such a cause of action could be brought by 
birth mothers and birth fathers alike. The Restatement (Second) 
of Torts describes the cause of action as follows: “One who, with 
knowledge that the parent does not consent, abducts, or otherwise 
compels or induces a minor child to leave a parent legally entitled 
to its custody or not to return to the parent after it has been left 
him, is subject to liability to the parent.”288 The elements of the 
cause of action require that: (1) the parent has a legal right to a 
parental relationship with the child; (2) the other party abducted 
the child or compelled the child to leave the parent’s custody; (3) 
such action was willful; and (4) the action was done with notice or 
knowledge that the parent did not consent.289 
Cases of adoption where a parent appears to have consented 
to the adoption do not facially look to satisfy the final element of 
the tort.290 But where consent was adduced by fraud, duress, 
                                                                                                     
 286. See D. Gordon Smith, The Critical Resource Theory of Fiduciary Duty, 55 
VAND. L. REV. 1399, 1400 (2002) (discussing the typical characteristics of 
relationships upon which courts typically impose fiduciary duties). 
 287. See Malinda L. Seymore, Grasping Fatherhood in Abortion and 
Adoption, 68 HASTINGS L.J. 817, 861 (2017) (noting that fathers have succeeded 
in their claims for tortious interference with parental rights where the birth 
mother never informed the father that she was pregnant with his child, depriving 
him of the opportunity to assert his parental rights). 
 288. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 700 (AM. LAW INST. 1977). 
 289. See 59 AM. JUR. 2D Parent and Child § 113 (Supp. 2018) (providing the 
four elements necessary to establish a claim of tortious interference with child 
custody); see, e.g., Wolf v. Wolf, 690 N.W.2d 887, 892 (Iowa 2005) (same); Wyatt 
v. McDermott, 725 S.E.2d 555, 563–64 (Va. 2012) (recognizing a cause of action 
for tortious interference with parental rights for the first time under Virginia 
law).  
 290. See Wyatt, 725 S.E.2d at 556 (clarifying that the facts of this case arose 
from an unauthorized adoption). 
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coercion, or undue influence, that consent is void.291 As one 
adoption law expert notes, “a finding that a consent is invalid is 
equivalent to a finding that there was never any consent at all.”292 
In two cases involving birth fathers, courts recognized that the 
tort applied to their adoption cases.293 In Kessel, the West Virginia 
Supreme Court of Appeals approved significant damages.294 In 
both cases the birth mothers, together with adoption agencies 
and/or adoption attorneys, sought to hide the birth and location of 
the child despite knowing that the birth fathers intended to assert 
an interest in parenting.295 In Wyatt v. McDermott,296 John Wyatt’s 
child was placed for adoption without his knowledge or consent.297 
In fact, the birth mother, at the urging of an adoption attorney, 
made false statements to John about her intentions regarding 
adoption and her due date so that he would not try to prevent the 
                                                                                                     
 291. See Samuels, supra note 209, at 512 (“As a general rule, consents may be 
aside in all jurisdictions for fraud, duress, or undue influence, usually for a limited 
period of time after consent has been given or after the adoption has been 
granted.”).  
 292. KATHERINE G. THOMPSON & JOAN H. HOLLINGER, 2 ADOPTION LAW AND 
PRACTICE § 8.02 (Victor Dorff ed., 1991). 
 293. See Kessel v. Leavitt, 511 S.E.2d 720, 765 (W. Va. 1998) (“[W]e hold that 
a parent may maintain a cause of action against one who tortuously interferes 
with a parent’s parental or custodial relationship with [his] minor child.”); see also 
Wyatt, 725 S.E.2d at 563–64 (recognizing a cause of action for tortious 
interference with parental rights for the first time under Virginia law). 
294.See Kessel, 511 S.E.2d at 819 (upholding a jury award of $2 million in 
compensatory damages and $5.85 million in punitive damages). Wyatt reached a 
confidential settlement. 
 295. See id. at 734–39 (noting that the father of the unborn child “opposed any 
adoption” and subsequently sought legal advice regarding his parental rights as 
the child’s biological father); see also Wyatt, 725 S.E.2d at 556–57 (explaining that 
the father accompanied the mother to multiple doctors’ appointments and “made 
plans with [the mother] to raise their child together”). In a case with strikingly 
similar facts to Kessel, the Mississippi Supreme Court recognized a cause of action 
for a birth father who alleged conspiracy to interfere with parental rights, though 
the court did not describe it as a case of tortious interference with parental rights. 
See Smith v. Malouf, 722 So. 2d 490, 497 (Miss. 1998) (recognizing that the father 
had a “constitutional right to be notified of or to withhold his consent to the 
adoption of his child” in light of his efforts to establish a relationship with the 
child). 
 296. 725 S.E.2d 555 (Va. 2012). 
 297. See id. at 557 (certifying two questions to the Virginia Supreme Court by 
the federal district court where John Wyatt filed actions against the adoption 
attorney and adoption agency for tortious interference with the parental 
relationship). 
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adoption.298 The birth mother went into labor two weeks early and 
even concealed the fact that she was in labor when she spoke to 
John on the phone.299 Prospective adoptive parents from Utah 
traveled to Virginia to take custody of the child and traveled back 
to Utah.300 John, not knowing of the adoption plans or that the 
child was in Utah, took steps in Virginia to establish paternity and 
filed in the Virginia putative father registry.301 The prospective 
adoptive parents filed their petition for adoption in Utah, their 
state of residence.302 Although the Virginia Juvenile and Domestic 
Relations Court granted John custody of Baby E.Z.,303 the Utah 
Supreme Court held that he had not strictly complied with the 
Utah adoption statutes and thus could not block the adoption.304 
John then brought suit in federal court in Virginia against the 
Utah adoption attorneys and adoption agency that facilitated the 
adoption.305 The federal court certified the question to the Virginia 
Supreme Court of whether Virginia recognized a cause of action for 
tortious interference with parental relationships.306 The Virginia 
Supreme Court recognized a cause of action for tortious 
interference with parental rights.307 The court noted the 
                                                                                                     
 298. See id. (“[The mother] continued to assure Wyatt that she still planned 
to raise the baby with him.”).  
 299. See id. (“[The child] was born two weeks early . . . and Wyatt was not 
informed of the birth.”). 
 300. See In re Baby E.Z., 266 P.3d 702, 705 (Utah 2011) (noting that the 
prospective parents obtained appropriate agency approval to travel back to Utah 
with Baby E.Z.). 
 301. See id. (acknowledging that Wyatt initiated custody and visitation 
proceedings in a Virginia juvenile and domestic relations court the day after the 
prospective parents received travel approval). 
 302. See id. (clarifying that the Petition for Adoption in the Utah district court 
was filed “while the Virginia custody and visitation action was proceeding”).  
 303. See id. (finding exclusive jurisdiction to determine the custody of baby 
E.Z. from reliance on the federal Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA)). 
 304. See id. (determining “that . . . Wyatt waived his rights to the child, that 
he could not intervene, and that his consent to the adoption was not required” 
because of his failure to raise a challenge to the PKPA or to the Utah court’s 
jurisdiction to hear the adoption proceeding). 
 305. Wyatt v. McDermott, 725 S.E.2d 555, 556 (Va. 2012). 
 306. See id. at 556 (“[A]nd, if so, what elements constitute such a tort.”).  
 307. See id. at 564 (answering the district court’s first certified question in the 
affirmative). 
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importance of the parent–child relationship and recognized “the 
essential value” of protecting a parent’s right to form a relationship 
with his or her child.308 Flowing from that right, then, was “a cause 
of action against third parties who seek to interfere with this 
right.”309 The court had strong words condemning the actions of the 
birth mother, the adoption agency, and the attorneys in this case. 
It is both astonishing and profoundly disturbing that in this 
case, a biological mother and her parents, with the aid of two 
licensed attorneys and an adoption agency, could intentionally 
act to prevent a biological father—who is in no way alleged to 
be an unfit parent—from legally establishing his parental 
rights and gaining custody of a child whom the mother did not 
want to keep, and that this father would have no recourse in the 
law. The facts as pled indicate that the Defendants went to 
great lengths to disguise their agenda from the biological father, 
including preventing notice of his daughter’s birth and hiding 
their intent to have an immediate out-of-state adoption, in order 
to prevent the legal establishment of his own parental rights. 
This Court has long recognized that the rights of an unwed 
father are deserving of protection . . . . The tort of tortious 
interference with parental rights may provide one means of 
such protection. Finally, we hope that the threat of a civil action 
would help deter third parties such as attorneys and adoption 
agencies from engaging in the sort of actions alleged to have 
taken place.310  
The court recognized that available damages included “both 
tangible and intangible damages, including compensatory 
damages for the expenses incurred in seeking the recovery of the 
child, lost services, lost companionship, and mental anguish.”311  
                                                                                                     
 308. See id. at 558 (“[R]ejecting tortious interference with parental rights as 
a legitimate cause of action would leave a substantial gap in the legal protection 
afforded to the parent-child relationship.”). 
 309. Id. at 558. 
 310. Id. at 564 (internal citations omitted).  
 311. Id. at 563. According to the Restatement, 
The parent can recover for the loss of society of his child and for his 
emotional distress resulting from its abduction or enticement. If there 
has been a loss of service or if the child, though actually not performing 
service, was old enough to do so, the parent can recover for the loss of 
the service that he could have required of the child during the period 
of its absence. He is also entitled to recover for any reasonable expenses 
incurred by him in regaining custody of the child and for any 
reasonable expenses incurred or likely to be incurred in treating or 
caring for the child if it has suffered illness or other bodily harm as a 
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The Wyatt court further noted that punitive damages would 
also be available under this tort.312 In Kessel v. Leavitt,313 the 
appellants—the birth mother, her parents, and her brother (who 
happened to be an attorney)—sought to challenge a West Virginia 
circuit court’s finding of tortious interference with the biological 
father’s parental rights.314 The jury in the lower court awarded the 
father $2 million in compensatory damages and $5.85 million in 
punitive damages.315  
C. Intentional/Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress 
Once the American Law Institute recognized an independent 
tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress in 1948’s 
publication of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, states followed 
suit.316 Most jurisdictions have now recognized the existence of an 
                                                                                                     
result of the defendant’s tortious conduct. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 700 cmt. g. (AM. LAW INST.1977); see also Dale 
Margolin Cecka, Terminating Parental Rights Through a Backdoor in the 
Virginia Code: Adoptions Under Section 63.2–1202(H), 48 U. RICH. L. REV. 371, 
410 (2013) (“Potential damages for tortious interference with parental rights 
include not only the cost of securing the parent’s rights but also mental anguish 
and lost companionship.”). 
 312. See Wyatt, 725 S.E.2d at 563 (“If a tortfeasor’s tort was 
intentional . . . and if the evidence is sufficient to support an award of 
compensatory damages, the victim’s right to punitive damages and the quantum 
thereof are jury questions.” (citing Smith v. Litten, 507 S.E.2d 77, 80 (Va. 1998))). 
 313. 511 S.E.2d 720 (W. Va. 1998). 
 314. Id. at 734. On appeal, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals 
dismissed the cause of action against the birth mother because her equal custody 
rights meant that she could not tortuously interfere with the father’s rights. See 
id. at 766 (“[W]e hold that a parent cannot charge his/her child’s other parent 
with tortious interference . . . if both parents have equal rights, or substantially 
equal rights, . . . to establish or maintain a parental or custodial relationship with 
their child.”).  
 315. Id. at 734. 
 316. One commentator traces the tort to an 1897 case, while noting the role 
of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. See John J. Kircher, The Four Faces of Tort 
Law: Liability for Emotional Harm, 90 MARQ. L. REV. 789, 795–99 (2007) 
(discussing the seminal case of Wilkinson v. Downton, (1897) 2 Q.B. 57, and the 
tort’s refinement in § 46 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts in 1965). 
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independent tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress.317 
The cause of action generally requires the following elements: 
“(1) a person acted intentionally or recklessly, (2) the conduct was 
extreme and outrageous, (3) the conduct caused the plaintiff’s 
emotional distress, and (4) the emotional distress was severe.”318 A 
person who acts recklessly or intentionally is liable under this 
tort.319 Further, “intent is defined to include situations in which 
the actor does not desire a certain result, but is substantially 
certain that a given result may occur.”320 Since the emotional 
distress associated with rightful separation in adoption is 
well-known,321 there would be little difficulty in establishing that 
an adoption agency worker could be substantially certain that a 
wrongful separation would cause emotional distress.322 As I wrote 
in a previous article,  
Mothers considering relinquishment report “conflicting feelings 
of shame, pride, desolation, excitement, fear, terror, and 
denial,” which “can be overwhelming and disruptive.” In the 
period immediately following relinquishment, birth mothers 
report that relinquishment brings “a powerful sense of loss and 
isolation.” Birth mothers reported traumatic dreams, sleep 
                                                                                                     
 317. See id. at 852–83 (providing a state-by-state catalogue of each 
jurisdiction’s law on intentional infliction of emotional distress); see also 
Annotation, Modern Status of Intentional Infliction of Mental Distress as 
Independent Tort; “Outrage”, 38 A.L.R. 4th 998, §§ 4–5 (1985) (collecting and 
analyzing cases decided since 1970 in which courts recognized or refused to 
recognize intentional infliction of emotional distress or outrage as an independent 
tort). 
 318. Milo v. Martin, 311 S.W.3d 210, 217 (Tex. App. 2010) (citing Bradford v. 
Vento, 48 S.W.3d 749, 758 (Tex. 2001)); see also Reagan v. City of Knoxville, 692 
F. Supp. 2d 891, 905 (E.D. Tenn. 2010) (“[T]he plaintiff must show that a 
defendant’s conduct was (1) intentional or reckless; (2) so outrageous that it 
cannot be tolerated in a civilized society; and (3) the cause of serious mental injury 
to the plaintiff.” (quoting Bain v. Wells, 936 S.W.2d 618, 622 (Tenn. 1997))). 
 319. See Kircher, supra note 316, at 798 (“[T]he actor is subject to liability if 
he intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress . . . .” (quoting 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (AM. LAW. INST. 1965))). 
 320. See id. at 799 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (AM. LAW. 
INST. 1965)). 
 321. See Seymore, supra note 7, at 138–40 (reviewing psychological studies 
showing both short-term and long-term psychological effects of relinquishing a 
child for adoption).  
 322. See id. at 138 (describing the “powerful sense of loss and isolation” and 
other traumatic effects that birth mothers reported experiencing following a 
rightful relinquishment).  
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disruption, and “a sense that the experience is surreal.” One 
study reported that fifty-five percent of birth mothers found 
signing the adoption papers to be “one of the most difficult parts 
of the adoption process,” and sixty-five percent of birth mothers 
reported feeling grief six months after birth . . . . In one study of 
birth mothers who returned to school after relinquishment, 
researchers found that the negative emotions felt by birth 
mothers adversely affected school performance. The birth 
mothers who experienced the most deterioration in school 
performance were preoccupied with grief and regret concerning 
the relinquishment decision and thought frequently about their 
personal loss. The majority of birth mothers expressed negative 
expectations about the future, expecting the bleakness they 
currently experienced to continue into the future.323 
In addition to immediate emotional distress, birth mothers 
experience long-term negative effects of adoption relinquishment 
on their emotions and psychological well-being that can last a 
lifetime.324 Birth fathers who lost a child to adoption report similar 
psychological effects.325 
In Smith v. Malouf,326 the Mississippi Supreme Court 
recognized that a birth father stated a cause of action for 
intentional infliction of emotional distress when the birth mother 
and her parents conspired to deny him his parental rights.327 In 
that case, the birth parents were teenaged and unwed.328 Upon 
learning of the pregnancy, Joey, the birth father, offered marriage 
                                                                                                     
 323. See id. at 138–39 (internal citations omitted). 
 324. See ROBIN WINKLER & MARGARET VAN KEPPEL, RELINQUISHING MOTHERS 
IN ADOPTION: THEIR LONG-TERM ADJUSTMENT 15 (1984) (conducting a study that 
revealed women who had relinquished a child fifteen to nineteen years earlier 
reported still experiencing intermittent or sustained mild depression, generalized 
anxiety disorder, and borderline personality or dependent personality disorder); 
George M. Burnell & Mary Ann Norfleet, Women Who Place Their Infant Up for 
Adoption: A Pilot Study, 16 PATIENT COUNSELING & HEALTH EDUC. 169 (1979). 
 325. See Seymore, supra note 287, at 848–49 (observing that birth fathers 
report feeling emotional distress after the adoption if they acquired a sense of 
fatherhood during the pregnancy, and describe the adoption as producing “deep 
and long-lasting feelings”). 
 326. 722 So. 2d 490 (Miss. 1998). 
 327. See id. at 493 (“The court erred in ruling that . . . [the plaintiff] . . . has 
no parental rights to receive notice of any adoption of, or to object to any adoption 
of, or to seek legal custody upon the birth of, his biological child.”).  
 328. Id.  
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but Natalie, the birth mother, said no.329 Joey said that he wished 
to raise the child on his own, but Natalie and her parents, the 
Maloufs, insisted that the child be placed for adoption.330 His 
attempts to change their minds were to no avail.331 When he went 
to Natalie’s home one last time, her parents told him “that Natalie 
was gone and that she would not be back until the child was 
born.”332 At that point, Joey initiated legal proceedings for 
paternity and custody and sought an injunction to prevent any 
adoption.333 A mutual friend called Joey and asked him to drop the 
suit, informing him that Natalie said she would not put the child 
up for adoption if he did so.334 The court granted a temporary 
restraining order to prevent any adoptive placement and issued a 
permanent injunction, which Joey sent to every office of Vital 
Statistics in Mississippi in an attempt to prevent an adoption.335 
Natalie ultimately moved to Georgia, where she gave birth.336 Joey 
discovered her location after hiring a private investigator and went 
to Georgia to start legal action, but by then Natalie and her mother 
had traveled to California and placed the child for adoption in 
Canada.337 
In recognizing that the facts as pled gave rise to a cause of 
action for intentional infliction of emotional distress, the court 
noted 
It is irrefutable that appellees’ behavior was intentional and 
that the foreseeable result of their actions was that the child 
would be adopted by strangers, thereby depriving Joey of an 
opportunity to veto the adoption and vie for custody. It is also 
axiomatic that any father—especially a father who has gone 
                                                                                                     
 329. See id. at 492 (noting that the couple did discuss their options regarding 
the baby, although no immediate decision was made). 
 330. Id. 
 331. See id. (stressing that the Maloufs remained firm regarding the child’s 
adoption, even after Joey’s parents allegedly “kidnapped and badgered” Natalie 
about their decision). 
 332. Id. 
 333. Id. 
 334. Id. 
 335. See id. (noting that the injunction enjoined Natalie “and all who might 
assist her” from proceeding with an adoption). 
 336. Id. 
 337. See id. (detailing Joey’s travels to Georgia to retain an attorney to assist 
in obtaining custody of the child and the child’s adoption to Canadian parents). 
948 76 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 895 (2019) 
 
that “extra mile” to gain custody of his child—would suffer 
severe emotional distress due to the child he wanted being 
secretly placed for adoption.338 
The court also found that Joey stated a cause of action for 
conspiracy to deprive him of his lawful rights as natural parent of 
the child.339 
When the interference with the parent–child relationship is 
wrongful, courts have accepted causes of action for intentional 
infliction of emotional distress.340 In Gouin v. Gouin,341 a mother 
stated a cause of action against her estranged husband for 
intentional infliction of emotional distress when he tried on six 
occasions to coerce her into relinquishing custody of their 
children.342 He filed unsupported criminal charges against her and 
then “Gouin and his attorney visited Dori’s divorce counsel at her 
office and offered to drop the application in exchange for Dori 
granting legal custody of their children to Gouin.”343 Cases where 
adoption agencies use undue influence and coercion to secure 
release of a child for adoption could similarly give rise to liability 
for intentional infliction of emotional distress.344 Similar to Gouin, 
                                                                                                     
 338. Id. at 498. 
 339. See id. (“The instant claim is that the defendants conspired to unlawfully 
violate the outstanding injunction and to deprive Joey of his lawful rights as 
natural parent of the child. These allegations are sufficient to pass Rule 12(b)(6) 
muster . . . .”). Without terming this cause of action “tortious interference with 
parental rights,” as recognized in the Restatement (Second) of Torts, the action 
seems to qualify. For further discussion of tortious interference with parental 
rights, see discussion supra Part III.B. 
 340. See, e.g., Raftery v. Scott, 756 F.2d 335, 337 (4th Cir. 1985) (finding that 
the birth mother wrongfully prevented rehabilitation of the relationship between 
the father and his child following a divorce supported the claim of intentional 
infliction of emotional distress); Bhama v. Bhama, 425 N.W.2d 733, 737 (Mich. 
Ct. App. 1988) (choosing not to address the issue of a psychiatrist father allegedly 
brainwashing his children into rejecting their mother). 
 341. 249 F. Supp. 2d 62 (D. Mass. 2003). 
 342. See id. at 73 (“[Plaintiff] cites to six separate incidents in which she 
claims [the defendant] knew or should have known that his conduct would have 
caused her emotional distress.”). 
 343. Id. at 68. 
 344. See discussion infra Part V (proposing a cause of action for wrongful 
separation where an agency or adoption worker attempts to secure a 
relinquishment of parental rights through fraud or trickery, or through coercion 
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the Supreme Court of Louisiana found consent to adoption invalid 
due to duress when the birth mother signed after a lengthy 
discussion and warning by the attorney for the adoptive parents 
that she could face criminal charges for child neglect if she did not 
relinquish the child.345 Threats of criminal charges could well 
amount to intentional infliction of emotional distress.346 
D. Legal Malpractice/Lawyer Misconduct 
Lawyers frequently facilitate adoption placements and, of 
course, provide the legal work necessary to make children 
available for adoption and to create new permanent parent–child 
relationships.347 Thus, lawyers can incur significant legal risks 
themselves for any misconduct in that regard.348 Legal malpractice 
is a risk of doing business for lawyers. One long-time legal 
malpractice defense attorney wrote 
Malpractice is becoming increasingly widespread, lawyers 
hardly ever win in jury trials, and settlement amounts are 
skyrocketing. An analysis of the 106 legal malpractice jury 
                                                                                                     
or undue influence). 
 345. See Wuertz v. Craig, 458 So. 2d 1311, 1313 (La. 1984) (“There is no 
evidence that such [criminal] charges were justified. She signed the act under the 
immediate influence of [the attorney’s] threat. Such a threat by law invalidates 
the consent procured.”). 
 346. See, e.g., Nigro v. Pickett, No. 9435/05, 2006 WL 940636, at *4 (N.Y. Sup. 
Ct. Mar. 17, 2006) (“[U]nder some circumstances threats of unjustified criminal 
charges . . . may rise to the level of outrageousness to sustain a cause of action for 
intentional infliction of emotional distress.”). 
 347. See, e.g., Lemley v. Kaiser, No. 1804, 1987 WL 10774, at *1 (Ohio Ct. 
App. Apr. 30, 1987) (involving the actions of two duly licensed and practicing Ohio 
attorneys who failed to follow the state’s private adoption placement provisions); 
Wyatt v. McDermott, 725 S.E.2d 555, 557 (Va. 2012) (describing the role of the 
attorneys and the Utah adoption agency in facilitating the adoption of Baby E.Z.). 
 348. See, e.g., supra notes 305–310 and accompanying text (condemning the 
actions of the adoption agency in intentionally trying to prevent the biological 
father from legally establishing his parental rights and subjecting the adoption 
attorneys to harsh criticism where they urged the birth mother to make false 
statements to the birth father regarding the child’s adoption); Lemley, 1987 WL 
10774, at *1 (referring to the matter as a “tragic illegal adoption dispute” 
facilitated by the adoption attorneys); In re Krigel, 480 S.W.3d 294, 302 (Mo. 2016) 
(en banc) (suspending the birth mother’s adoption attorney from the practice of 
law for six months for committing multiple violations of the rules of professional 
conduct in an adoption proceeding). 
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verdicts in Los Angeles County in 1988 and 1989 showed that 
lawyers lost ninety-three percent of the time. Similarly, the 
Author’s own analysis of forty-two legal malpractice cases in 
southern California, thirty-three of which were disposed of 
between 1991 and 1992, showed that, consistent with his prior 
experience in over nine-hundred cases, an overwhelming 
eighty-eight percent of the clients or non-clients suing for legal 
malpractice were compensated, and the average settlement was 
a significant $60,393.349 
Generally, legal malpractice requires the following elements:  
(1) the duty of an attorney to use such skill, prudence, and 
diligence as members of the profession commonly possess and 
exercise, (2) a breach of that duty, (3) a proximate causal 
connection between the breach and the resulting injury, and 
(4) actual loss or damage resulting from the attorney’s 
negligence.350  
 Legal malpractice actions, where birth parents are 
represented by counsel, might provide recourse for wrongful family 
separation. However, several issues might prevent such liability. 
Oftentimes, birth parents are not represented by counsel during 
an adoption and state laws rarely require such representation.351 
Oftentimes, even if birth parents are represented by counsel, they 
are not provided independent counsel and instead are represented 
by the same attorney representing the adoptive parents.352 In 
Maryland, for example, the statute providing for appointed counsel 
for minor mothers does not explicitly require counsel to be 
independent and allows the attorney to represent the adoption 
agency or prospective adoptive parents to the extent that the 
general conflict of interest rules of professional conduct would 
                                                                                                     
 349. Manuel R. Ramos, Legal Malpractice: The Profession’s Dirty Little Secret, 
47 VAND. L. REV. 1657, 1661 (1994) (internal citations omitted). 
 350. 7 AM. JUR. 2D Attorneys at Law § 192 (Supp. 2018). 
 351. See Seymore, supra note 7, at 129 (“Independent legal counsel for a 
prospective birth mother is not universally required in the United States.”). 
 352. See id. at 129–30 (noting that only four states require minors to have 
independent legal counsel, meaning that the attorney cannot also represent the 
adoptive parents or the adoption agency facilitating the placement). 
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permit.353 In In re J.M.P.,354 the birth mother was represented by 
the law partner of the lawyer representing the prospective 
adoptive parents.355 While Louisiana’s state statute required that 
she be represented by counsel, it did not require independent 
counsel.356 The Supreme Court of Louisiana concluded that the 
lawyer was not prohibited from representing the birth mother, 
Dawn, despite the potential that his representation could be 
“materially limited by his own interest in preventing abortions by 
promoting adoptions.”357  
In Lemley v. Barr,358 Tammy, the minor birth mother, was 
deceived by the lawyers handling the adoption.359 She 
subsequently brought a legal malpractice action against the 
lawyers.360 She sought recovery of legal fees expended to recover 
                                                                                                     
 353. See MD. CODE ANN. FAM. LAW § 5-307(c) (2008) (“An attorney or firm may 
represent more than one party in a case under this subtitle only if the Maryland 
Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct allow.”). 
 354. 528 So. 2d 1002 (La. 1988), superseded by statute, LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. 
art. 1143 (2013), as stated in In re A.J.F., 764 So. 2d 47 (La. 2000). 
 355. See id. at 1005 (“[Counsel for the adoptive parents] brought along his law 
partner . . . to act as [the birth mother’s] attorney and to advise her of her 
rights.”). 
 356. See id. at 1010 (“At the time of the act of surrender [the 
statute] . . . provided simply that ‘the surrendering parent or parents shall be 
represented by an attorney at the execution of the act of surrender.’” (citing LA. 
STAT. ANN. § 9:422.7 (repealed 1992)). After the time the birth mother, Dawn, 
executed her consent, the legislature explicitly added language requiring that an 
attorney for a birth mother “shall not be the attorney who represents the person 
or persons who are the prospective adoptive parents, or an attorney who is a 
partner or employee of the attorney or law firm representing the prospective 
adoptive parents.” Id. (citing LA. STAT. ANN. § 9:422.7 (repealed 1992)). However, 
there was no such language at the time Dawn executed her consent. Id.  
 357. Id. at 1012. The court did not rest its decision on whether a conflict of 
interest existed, but rather looked to determine “if there was any other factor 
which may have prevented Dawn from making a voluntary and knowing 
surrender” and concluded that there was none. See id. (“The record reflects that 
Dawn was a young adult capable of exercising her own judgment.”). 
 358. 43 S.E.2d 101 (W. Va. 1986). 
 359. See id. at 103 (“[T]he young couple returned to the law offices, executed 
the papers, and relinquished the child . . . . At no time did [the adoption attorney] 
explain to Tammy . . . or Tammy’s parents that under [applicable state] law, 
a[] . . . Probate Court judge had to witness and approve a minor’s consent.”). 
 360. Lemley v. Kaiser, No. 1804, 1987 WL 10774, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 
30, 1987). She also brought causes of action for breach of fiduciary duty and 
negligent or intentional interference with right to custody. Id. at *2. 
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her child, other compensatory damages, and punitive damages.361 
The trial court initially granted her motion for summary 
judgement on liability against the Kaiser firm.362 However, the 
lower court sua sponte reconsidered and entered summary 
judgement in favor of the lawyers.363 The Ohio Court of Appeals 
agreed, finding that no attorney-client relationship existed 
between Tammy and the lawyers.364 It was not enough that 
Tammy might have believed the lawyers were representing her, 
since “[t]he Kaiser firm here engaged in no representations or 
conduct which could reasonably induce [Tammy] to believe they 
represented her.”365  
It may not, however, be so straightforward as to who the 
attorney is representing in the adoption. As two adoption law 
attorneys note 
For example, some attorneys easily slip into taking on dual roles 
or become overly zealous in representing a client’s interests, 
possibly leading to lack of clarity as to who is owed the duty of 
care. It is also too easy for attorneys to become caught up in the 
view that family formation work always exemplifies goodness 
and morality, possibly causing them to disregard the interests 
of the other parent as the lawyer marches toward the goal of 
creating a new and legally recognized parent/child 
relationship.366 
The New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division found, in 
circumstances similar to the Lemley case, that the attorney was, in 
fact, representing the birth mother.367 The case was not a legal 
                                                                                                     
 361. Id. at *2. 
 362. Id. 
 363. Id. 
 364. See id. at *4 (“It is clear that no formal, explicit relationship existed. A 
retainer was never signed, [Tammy] paid no legal fees to the Kaiser firm, nor did 
the firm ever send her a bill.”). 
 365. Id. at *5. 
 366. See Dana E. Prescott & Gary A. Debele, Shifting Ethical and Social 
Conundrums and “Stunningly Anachronistic” Laws: What Lawyers in Adoption 
and Assisted Reproduction May Want to Consider, 30 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL 
LAW. 127, 153 (2017) (discussing both ARTs and adoption cases). 
 367. See Tierney v. Flower, 32 A.d.2d 392, 396 (N.Y. App. 1969) (“[W]hile [the 
lawyer-appellant] maintained that he never represented the petitioner and her 
parents and acted only for his anonymous clients, it is our view that actually the 
ADOPTING CIVIL DAMAGES 953 
malpractice case, but resolution did turn on whether the lawyer 
was representing the birth mother.368 The court held that the 
attorney was representing “both sides of the transaction in which 
he acted” where the birth mother had no attorney of her own and 
the prospective adoptive parents’ attorney prepared papers for the 
birth mother’s signature.369 He advised the birth mother of her 
legal rights with respect to the adoption process, including her 
right to appear and to object in the adoption proceeding.370  
The Lemley court was following the traditional rule that “an 
attorney is not liable to a non-client for malpractice in the 
performance of professional services.”371 There is an exception to 
this rule, however, where the attorney committed fraud or 
collusion or other intentional misconduct.372 There, the lawyer may 
be liable to non-clients.373 In a non-adoption case, the New York 
Supreme Court, Appellate Division found a viable cause of action 
where the attorney took affirmative steps to prevent the proceeds 
from a settlement agreement from being disbursed to a 
non-client.374 He “afforded substantial assistance to his client by 
concealing the sale of the property from third-party plaintiff and 
her attorney and directing the buyer to wire the sale proceeds 
                                                                                                     
appellant represented both sides of the transaction . . . .”). 
 368. See id. (involving the lawyer’s duty to reveal the adoptive parents’ 
identity to the birth parents where the adoptive parents requested “a veil of 
secrecy”).  
 369. Id.  
 370. Id. 
 371. Alan L. Cohen, Liability to Non-Clients for Malpractice, 3 PERSONAL 
INJURY—ACTIONS, DEFENSES, DAMAGES § 11.06 (2018). 
 372. See id. (“An adversary party may have a cause of action against an 
attorney for fraudulent, malicious, or intentional misrepresentations.”); 
Developments in the Law—Lawyers’ Responsibilities and Lawyers’ Responses, 107 
HARV. L. REV. 1547, 1551 (1994) (“Where once only the client could bring a 
malpractice action against the lawyer, now third parties can bring 
lawsuits . . . .”). 
 373. See Cohen, supra note 371 (discussing other unprofessional or 
intentional conduct for which the attorney may be liable to third parties, 
including conspiracy, “insulting and abusive language that causes mental 
distress,” and false imprisonment); see, e.g., Goerke v. Vojvodich, 226 N.W.2d 211, 
215 (Wis. 1975) (stating the seller’s lawyer could be liable to the buyers for 
misrepresentations with intent to mislead or misinform during negotiations for a 
property transaction).  
 374. See Sayles v. Ferone, 137 A.D.3d 486, 486 (N.Y. App. Div. 2016) (finding 
a viable claim against the attorney for aiding and abetting conversion). 
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directly into plaintiff’s account at a small out-of-state bank, rather 
than depositing the proffered check into his escrow account.”375 The 
facts translate into the adoption context, sounding eerily familiar 
to a recent case where a long-time adoption attorney was 
sanctioned for concealment on behalf of his birth mother client 
from the birth father.  
In In re Krigel,376 an experienced adoption law attorney was 
suspended from the practice of law because of his conduct directed 
at the birth father.377 The attorney represented the birth mother, 
but knew (1) the identity of the birth father, (2) that he did not 
consent to the adoption, and (3) that he was represented by 
counsel.378 Nonetheless, at the hearing on the birth mother’s 
relinquishment of her parental rights, her attorney solicited 
testimony from the birth mother that the birth father had been 
consulted and that he had “not stepped forward since the birth of 
the child claiming any rights to the child.”379 It would have been 
difficult for the birth father to step forward, since he was deceived 
as to the due date of the child, was not told that the child was born 
and was not informed of the hearing. The court found violations of 
the duty of candor in lawyer Krigel’s representation to the trial 
court: “by permitting false and misleading testimony to be 
presented, [it] was designed to portray the false impression that 
Birth Father was not interested in the child or in asserting his 
parental rights.”380 The lawyer also lied to the birth father’s lawyer 
when he assured him that the child would not be placed for 
                                                                                                     
 375. Id.  
 376. 480 S.W.3d 294 (Mo. 2016) (en banc). 
 377. See id. at 302 (staying the suspension subject to successful completion of 
a two-year term of probation). 
 378. See id. at 309 (Fischer, J., dissenting)  
[G]iven [the attorney’s understanding of the father’s identity and 
wishes], Respondent’s conduct, including his conversation with [the 
birth father’s attorney], his instructions to the mother and her family 
to have no communication with the father, and his overall 
implementation of his “passive strategy” to “actively do nothing,” had 
no substantial purpose other than to impair and delay the father’s 
assertion of his parental rights . . . . 
 379. Id. at 298. 
 380. Id. at 299. 
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adoption without the father’s consent, and had already at that time 
told the birth mother to cut off all contact with the birth father 
about the child’s birth and the adoption.381 When the birth father 
learned of the birth of the child and that the child had been placed 
with prospective adoptive parents, he intervened and the trial 
court denied the adoption and awarded the birth father legal and 
physical custody of the child.382 Without that resolution, the lawyer 
might well have faced a lawsuit for tortious interference with 
parental rights together with the sanction from the disciplinary 
authorities. Furthermore, the case falls squarely within the 
general rule that “attorneys may owe a duty of care to nonclients 
when the attorneys know, or should know, that nonclients will rely 
on the attorney’s representations and the nonclients are not too 
remote from the attorneys to be entitled to protection.”383 
V. Proposing a New Cause of Action: Wrongful Family Separation 
Ever has it been that love knows not its own depth until the 
hour of separation. 
      —Kahlil Gibran384 
Torts can be viewed as simply a way to redress private 
grievances. But it can also be theorized, as John Goldberg notes, 
as “occasions for judges and juries to regulate behavior on a 
forward-looking basis.”385 In this view, “tort had transformed itself 
from private to ‘public’ law, whereby it functioned to achieve 
collective, not corrective, justice.”386 From this perspective, tort law 
“can, in principle, deter the defendant and other similarly situated 
actors from engaging in conduct [the courts] deem undesirable.”387 
A social justice variant of this view considers that tort law “permits 
                                                                                                     
 381. See id. at 298 (“Krigel represented to Zimmerman that the child would 
not be adopted without Birth Father’s consent.”). 
 382. Id. 
 383. 7 AM. JUR. 2D Attorneys at Law § 221, Westlaw (database updated Feb. 
2019). 
 384. KHALIL GIBRAN, THE PROPHET 9 (1973). 
 385. John C.P. Goldberg, Twentieth-Century Tort Theory, 91 GEO. L.J. 513, 
524 (2003). 
 386. Id. 
 387. Id. at 525. 
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independent judges and especially juries to hold corporate America 
and other powerful actors accountable.”388 And, praising the 
flexibility of tort law, Michael Rustad noted, “The great value of 
torts lies in its ability to evolve to meet the emergent harms of each 
era.”389 As one court noted, “Although loathe to create new causes 
of action in tort, the law must nevertheless adapt to the society in 
which it exists.”390 Scholars and reformers have proposed the 
creation of new torts to address changes in society: a tort for 
private suppression of speech;391 a tort action for racial insults;392 
for spoliation;393 for workplace sexual harassment;394 for negligent 
interference with credit;395 for computer and software 
malfunction;396 and for seduction.397 Some calls for new torts have 
                                                                                                     
 388. Michael L. Rustad, Torts as Public Wrongs, 38 PEPP. L. REV. 433, 460 
(2011). 
 389. Id. at 521. 
 390. Silver v. Levittown Union Free Sch. Dist., 692 N.Y.S.2d 886, 887 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. 1999). 
 391. See Rory Lancman, Protecting Speech From Private Abridgement: 
Introducing the Tort of Suppression, 25 SW. U. L. REV. 223, 242 (1996) (“Like all 
torts, a mixture of justice and policy combine to make suppression a worthwhile 
tort action.”). 
 392. See Richard Delgado, Words that Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults, 
Epithets, and Name-Calling, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 133, 149 (1982) (arguing 
that “[t]he psychological, sociological, and political repercussions of the racial 
insult demonstrate the need for judicial relief”). 
 393. See Terry R. Spencer, Do Not Fold Spindle or Mutilate: The Trend 
Towards Recognition of Spoliation as a Separate Tort, 30 IDAHO L. REV. 37, 39 
(1993) (noting that some states have recognized spoliation as a distinct tort due 
to its regularity and frequency in civil litigation). 
 394. See Krista J. Schoenheider, A Theory of Tort Liability for Sexual 
Harassment in the Workplace, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 1461, 1462 (1986) (stating that 
“tort law is the only body of law that provides a private remedy for personal harm 
caused by sexual harassment,” but that “[i]n its present form . . . tort law fails to 
deal with the full effects of harassment on the individual victim”). 
 395. See Leonard J. Long, An Uneasy Case for a Tort of Negligent Interference 
with Credit Contract, 22 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 235, 236 (2003) (“[T]he thesis of this 
paper is that the law should at least recognize a very narrow and circumscribed 
tort of negligent interference with [credit] contract.”). 
 396. See Rustad, supra note 388, at 548 (“The courts have all said no to 
recognizing a new tort of computer malpractice and the result is that software 
makers disclaim all liability and limit their warranties and enjoy a lawsuit 
immunity zone.”). 
 397. See Jane E. Larson, “Women Understand So Little, They Call My Good 
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been quite successful, including in 1939, William Prosser’s call for 
a new tort for intentional infliction of emotional suffering,398 and 
in 1890, Samuel D. Warren’s and Louis D. Brandeis’ call to 
recognize a right to privacy.399 
 All these proposals begin with a recognition of some significant 
right that needs protection through tort remedy. The right of 
parents in their children is such a right, elevated to constitutional 
importance.400 The rights of parents vis-à-vis their children include 
the right to custody and visitation,401 the right to control education 
                                                                                                     
Nature ‘Deceit’”: A Feminist Rethinking of Seduction, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 374, 
382– 412 (1993) (noting the history of the tort of seduction and its current 
application in modern law). 
 398. See William L. Prosser, Intentional Infliction of Mental Suffering: A New 
Tort, 37 MICH. L. REV. 874, 874 (1939) (“It is time to recognize that the courts have 
created a new tort. . . . It consists of the intentional, outrageous infliction of 
mental suffering in an extreme form.”). 
 399. See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 
HARV. L. REV. 193, 214 (1890) (arguing for a right to privacy, such as the right 
found at the time in France). 
 400. See M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 107 (1996) (noting that Mississippi 
cannot deprive M.L.B. “because of her poverty, [of] appellate review of the 
sufficiency of the evidence on which the trial court found her unfit to remain a 
parent”); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972) (“The private interest here, 
that of a man in the children he has sired and raised, undeniably warrants 
deference and, absent a powerful countervailing interest, protection.”); Pierce v. 
Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534–35 (1925) (“[W]e think it entirely plain that the 
Act of 1922 unreasonably interferes with the liberty of parents and guardians to 
direct the upbringing and education of children under their control.”); Meyer v. 
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (guaranteeing as fundamental an individual’s 
right to “establish a home and bring up children”). 
 401. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 64 (2000) (affirming the Washington 
Supreme Court’s holding that “parents have a right to limit visitation of their 
children with third persons”); Stanley, 405 U.S. at 651 (recognizing a parent’s 
interest in “the companionship, care, custody, and management of his or her 
children”); In re Pensom, 126 S.W.3d 251, 254 (Tex. App. 2003) (citing Troxel in 
saying that “[e]ncompassed within the well-established fundamental right of 
parents to raise their children is the right to determine with whom their children 
should associate”). 
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and training,402 the right to the earnings of the child,403 and the 
right to inherit from or through the child.404 Additionally, it 
includes “the necessity for the parent to consent to the adoption of 
the child.”405 Because of the fundamental nature of parental rights, 
when a state seeks to terminate parental rights involuntarily 
(without the parent’s consent), the Constitution requires a 
heightened standard of proof—clear and convincing evidence.406 
Before a parent can relinquish that right, the relinquishment must 
be fully voluntary.407 Existing tort law may not fully vindicate 
these rights, calling for recognition of a new tort to fully protect 
parental rights when interfered with by adoption agencies and 
adoption workers, including lawyers. 
Wrongful separation of children and parents needs a new tort 
to supplement existing tort causes of action. As discussed 
previously, existing causes of action may present issues because of 
questions as to consent, legal right to establish a relationship for 
unwed fathers, relationship between birth parents and the lawyers 
involved in the adoption, measures of damages, and the like. 
                                                                                                     
 402. See Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534–35 (identifying directing the upbringing and 
education of children as a liberty interest of parents and guardians); Barrett v. 
Steubenville City Schs., 388 F.3d 967, 972 (6th Cir. 2004) (“[I]t is clearly 
established that parents have a fundamental right to direct the education of their 
children.”); J.W.J. v. P.K.R., 999 So. 2d 943, 951 (Ala. Civ. App. 2008) (“It is a 
custodial parent’s fundamental right to direct and control the upbringing and 
education of his or her child.”). 
 403. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 118–19 (1989) (listing the 
right to a child’s services and earnings as a right of parenthood); N.A.H. v. S.L.S., 
9 P.3d 354, 359 (Colo. 2000) (“The determination of parenthood includes the right 
to parenting time; the right to direct the child’s activities; the right to make 
decisions regarding the control, education, and health of the child; and the right 
to the child’s services and earnings.”). 
 404. See, e.g., McCabe v. McCabe, 78 P.3d 956, 958 (Okla. 2003) (observing 
the right of a parent to inherit from or through their child); see also Paula A. 
Monopoli, “Deadbeat Dads”: Should Support and Inheritance Be Linked?, 49 U. 
MIAMI L. REV. 257, 262 (1994) (noting the long-standing common law rule that 
fathers had “the right to inherit their children’s estates in intestacy.”). 
 405. McCabe, 78 P.3d at 958. 
 406. See Seymore, supra note 7, at 148 (“When a state seeks to terminate 
parental rights involuntarily (without the parent’s consent), the Constitution 
requires a heightened standard of clear and convincing evidence.”). 
 407. See id. (stating that “[v]oluntary relinquishment of parental rights cuts 
off all parental rights”).  
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Although those issues are not insurmountable, a new cause of 
action could be constructed to avoid these issues, and in so doing 
deter the kind of misconduct that has led to wrongful family 
separation. The elements of such a cause of action would be as 
follows: (1) a duty owed by adoption professionals to preserve 
parental rights to biological parents, including birth fathers; (2) a 
breach of that duty by fraud, trickery, deceit, duress, coercion, 
undue influence or other wrongful act; (3) a resulting harm to the 
parent–child relationship; and (4) a finding of damages, including 
noneconomic damages. 
A new cause of action should recognize a duty owed by 
adoption professionals to birth parents to preserve parental rights. 
The duty should be owed to both birth parents, even biological 
fathers who have not yet been recognized as having legal rights.408 
The duty must be strong enough to offset the agency’s profit motive 
to serve those paying the fees, adoptive parents.409 An agency or 
adoption worker owes that duty to birth parents regardless of 
whether the birth parent is formally a client of the agency or 
adoption worker or adoption lawyer.410 An agency or adoption 
worker breaches the duty when it attempts to secure a 
relinquishment of parental rights through fraud or trickery, or 
through coercion or undue influence.411 Adoption counseling 
should be truly neutral, without an agenda to secure consent to 
adoption and only after a birth parent has been fully informed of 
his or her parental rights.412 An agency would fulfil its duty to fully 
                                                                                                     
 408. As previously noted, some courts reject claims for tortious interference 
with parental rights for birth fathers who have not yet secured legal recognition 
of rights. Under this new cause of action, such result should be foreclosed. 
 409. See supra Part II for a discussion of the business motivation of adoption 
agencies. 
 410. For further discussion concerning the difficulty of legal malpractice 
actions when birth parents are not seen as the client of the lawyer handling the 
adoption for adoptive parents, see supra notes 376–383 and accompanying text. 
The new cause of action seeks to avoid that result. 
 411. See supra Part IV for a discussion of fraud, coercion and undue influence. 
 412. See, e.g., Methodist Mission Home v. N.A.B., 451 S.W.2d 539, 543 (Tex. 
App. 1970) (examining a case where the plaintiff was coerced by her counselor 
into consenting to the adoption of her child); In re Interest of Perry, 641 P.2d 178 
(Ct. App. Wash. 1982), discussed, supra at text accompanying footnotes 264, 266, 
and 273. For a description of adoption counseling that masquerades as 
non-directive, while steering a prospective birth mother toward relinquishment, 
see Seymore, supra note 7, at 117–19 (describing counseling materials provided 
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inform birth parents of their parental rights if it provided 
independent legal counsel for each birth parent. In a previous 
article, I outlined the advice such an attorney should provide: 
 
a. legal rights and responsibility of parents; 
b. consequences of termination of parental rights for the legal 
 rights and responsibility of parents, including rights of 
 inheritance, confidentiality of adoption records, and legal 
 requirements for future contact between parent and child; 
c. circumstances in which the relinquishment of parental 
rights  can be revoked and consent to adoption can be 
withdrawn; 
d. availability or unavailability of post-adoption contact 
 agreements in the relevant jurisdiction and the legal 
 enforceability of such agreements; 
e. legal obligation of both parents to provide financial support 
 for their child and the availability of state services to 
 determine paternity and enforce child support orders; 
f. eligibility of birth parent and child for state and federal 
 welfare assistance; 
g. right of the parent to be present in court for termination of 
 parental rights and/or finalization of adoption and the right 
 to waive such right; and 
h. limitation on any representation of the parent, including a 
 statement that the attorney will not be representing the 
 parent in any contested adoption.413 
When there has been a breach of the duty owed, the harm to 
the parent–child relationship should include any family 
separation, even if birth parents ultimately regain custody and 
retain parental rights. In a case like In re Krigel,414 for instance, 
where the adoption attorney systematically worked to exclude the 
birth father but the birth father ultimately prevailed and gained 
custody, the lawyer should be liable for the period of separation 
                                                                                                     
by the National Council for Adoption, an advocacy group for adoptive parents and 
adoption agencies). 
 413. Seymore, supra note 7, at 154–56. 
 414. 480 S.W.3d 294 (Mo. 2016). 
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before the child was returned to the parent.415 Damages should 
include loss of consortium, emotional pain and suffering, and the 
costs associated in seeking to regain custody of children.416 
Punitive damages should also be available. 
VI. Conclusion 
Arguing for ethical adoption practices should be as simple as 
doing the right thing because it is right. After all, the well-being of 
families and children is of paramount importance to society. But 
when one recognizes that adoption practitioners are motivated by 
the same business issues facing any corporation making and 
selling widgets, we recognize that the incentives may change 
perversely. As business ethicists Ronald Francis and Anona 
Armstrong put it, “Ethics has often been seen as something outside 
normal business practice—something that is good and proper, good 
to have, but something of a luxury in the turmoil and competitive 
environment of the business world.”417 But ethical practice can be 
viewed as part of an effective risk management strategy.418 Francis 
argues for ethical principles that seem equally relevant to adoption 
agencies and widget-makers, such as dignity in treating 
disempowered suppliers, prudence in making bad situations no 
worse, avoidance of suffering, and honesty and openness in “not 
concealing that which should be revealed.”419 To the extent that 
aspirational ethical standards are not persuasive to a business, he 
reminds us that “legal compliance must have primacy.”420 
Tort law is about more than compensation for victims. “Civil 
justice for plaintiffs derives from the fairness of the process, the 
right to have one’s story told, meaningful remedy, and one 
                                                                                                     
 415. For discussion of Krigel, see supra notes 376–383 and accompanying text. 
 416. This would be in line with damages awardable in causes of action for 
tortious interference with parental rights and intentional infliction of emotional 
distress. In addition, this would avoid any problems of economic damages in fraud 
actions. 
 417. Ronald Francis & Anona Armstrong, Ethics as a Risk Management 
Strategy: The Australian Experience, 45 J. BUS. ETHICS 375, 375 (2003). 
 418. See id. at 376 (arguing “that there are compelling reasons to consider 
good ethical practices to be an essential part of risk management”). 
 419. Id. 
 420. Id. at 378. 
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additional factor: plaintiffs ask the legal system to take steps to 
prevent repetition of their tragedy.”421 Wrongful family separation 
in adoption can be deterred by lawsuits for money damages. 
Agencies are not exclusively social welfare institutions, they are 
businesses. Recall that one adoption worker conceded, ruefully, 
“We provide a fabulous service, but at the end of the day, we are a 
business.”422 As businesses, they need to maximize profits by 
reducing costs. Minimizing the risk of litigation has motivated 
adoption agencies to change behavior in the past, in the context of 
wrongful adoption, and will likely do so in the future. Agencies, 
adoption workers, and adoption lawyers that do not prioritize 
family preservation face legal risk in lawsuits for fraud, 
intentional infliction of emotional distress, tortious interference 
with parental rights, and legal malpractice. Further, courts may 
well be persuaded to recognize a new tort for wrongful family 
separation. 
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